By Enver Robelli
As for the result, we should wait for the announcement of the final outcome by the Central Election Commission. Experience has shown that surveys, exit polls, and similar projections are not always accurate. The votes that arrived by mail have not yet been counted. These are mainly votes from the diaspora. And there are more than 100,000 of them.
But one thing is clear and hardly surprising: the citizens of Kosovo have grown tired of elections. Within 16 months, Kosovo has voted three times at the national level. Add to that one round of local elections, plus the runoff vote. This means citizens have been called to the polls five times in less than a year and a half. Quite a few people have taken this as a personal insult. Many Kosovars began voting on Friday and Saturday by getting into their cars and heading to Albania or elsewhere for the weekend. This is called “voting with one’s feet.” It, too, is a form of protest.
Ahead of the December 28 elections, the Vetëvendosje Movement successfully promoted the narrative that the other parties were to blame for the political crisis. This time, that narrative convinced far fewer people than it did on December 28. Public enthusiasm was not boosted either by the distribution of money from the state budget on the eve of the elections — a practice that remains just as ugly now as it was before.
It was clear that the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) would not fall below 13 percent. For now, its increase appears to be around 5 percent. If it remains so, it is a respectable gain, though not a spectacular one.
The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) have preserved or slightly improved their electoral base. This can be considered a success.
Everyone sees themselves as a winner. Yet all parties received fewer votes than in the December elections.
As for the campaign, it was a monotonous one. Almost entirely devoid of new ideas. It consisted largely of repeating the promises made in December last year, when parliamentary elections were held. The campaign was dominated more by personal attacks and trivialities than by substance.
It remains to be seen whether political parties will draw any lessons from this situation.
For now, it is unclear whether the largest party will manage to form a government with the support of non-Serb minority deputies. What is clear is that the election of a president will require an agreement among parties to secure the quorum of 80 deputies. With the exception of Vetëvendosje, no other party has enough votes to nominate a presidential candidate. Once again, the need arises for a compromise around a president worthy of the office. No political party and no politician has any reason for euphoria.
Kosovo is entering a period of uncertainty.
First, at the end of July, a verdict is expected in the trial of the former leaders of Kosovo’s liberation war. If the judgment is unfavorable to them (and to Kosovo), there could be strong reactions across the country. Institutional stability is therefore essential.
Second, the dialogue with Belgrade has stagnated and the European Union has, unfortunately, exerted more pressure on Kosovo than on Serbia. Kosovo’s political class will sooner or later have to find an answer to the question of what to do regarding the commitment it has undertaken to establish an association of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo. This burden can hardly be carried by a single party alone. Pretending the issue does not exist will not make the problem disappear. Yes to the rule of law everywhere in Kosovo, without compromise, but not to the distortion of politics into songs accompanied by the sharki and çifteli.
Third, foreign policy requires greater professionalism and realism. The time has come to abandon crude falsehoods such as “with me Kosovo will join NATO” or “with me Kosovo will integrate into the EU.” These are not personal matters. The EU has moved closer to the joint proposal of Rama and Vučić: no membership, but rather a form of integration into certain areas of the EU. It could be called third-class membership. There are benefits from access to the European common market and participation in some meetings in Brussels, but without decision-making rights.
Fourth, investments in the energy sector, including certain specific requests from the United States, should be treated seriously and discussed through an open-minded public debate.
Fifth, whoever becomes prime minister should keep one thing in mind: the team must be held accountable. Ministers cannot simply vegetate in office for four years without leaving a visible mark on governance. Whoever becomes president must understand that Kosovo is not a presidential republic and that cooperation and coordination are essential for the country’s success. The great disease of Kosovo’s politicians is the ambition to present themselves as close to Western partners through corridor handshakes and photographs captured by a not-so-smart phone. All of this is accompanied by grand promises that ultimately prove empty. Successful politics is built through systematic work, total restraint of ego, and above all, professionalism.