By Dritan Hila
Nearly half a century after the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, that very republic now risks being overthrown itself—an event that would profoundly shake the entire Middle East.
When Ayatollah Khomeini toppled the Shah in 1979, Iran had 40 million inhabitants and produced 6 million barrels of oil per day. War with Iraq erupted almost immediately, and the world became engulfed in terrorism branded with an Islamic label. Forty-seven years later, Iran has nearly 90 million people. Although it produces roughly half the amount of oil, its capacities have not diminished at all; on the contrary, the ideological thread has made it even more dangerous.
Iran is not a rudimentary state ruled by a dictator and forty thugs who kill and steal on his behalf. On the contrary, it is a theocratic republic with a complex system where currents, interests, and ethnicities intertwine, making regime change anything but simple. Its very political system demonstrates this.
Iran has a parliament of 290 members, but largely with consultative functions, since its laws must be approved by the Guardian Council, just as candidates in elections must be vetted by that same council. The Guardian Council has 12 members: six appointed by the Supreme Leader and six by the Judiciary. They resemble a political bureau from the era of monism that supports the Supreme Leader—but here we arrive at the paradox of the dog chasing its tail, because these twelve must themselves be approved by Parliament. When contradictions arise, the Expediency Council steps in, acting as mediator and as an adviser to the Supreme Leader on foreign policy. At the top, of course, stands the Supreme Leader, who takes the final decisions—but even he is checked by the Assembly of Experts, an 86-member body composed entirely of clerics, elected every eight years, with the authority to annul the Supreme Leader’s orders. Yet the candidates for this body are approved by the Guardian Council.
This entire system has been engineered to limit the absolute power of a single individual, which is why it is called a theocratic republic.
Added to this complexity is the Revolutionary Guard—a state within the state.
Then come the entanglements of ethnicity. For example, there are around 20 million Azeris in Iran, twice as many as in Azerbaijan itself. The President of Iran is an Azeri.
Iran is a state with a 2,500-year history, exerting not only demographic but also historical and cultural influence across the region. The Persians were the ones who pushed the Hellenes to the gates of Europe. Later came encounters with Alexander and then with the Romans. Despite contractions and expansions, Persian remained the cultural language of the Middle East. In the courts of the Ottoman sultans, it was the language of the court.
Persia itself was the cherry on top of the cake once called the Golden Crescent, from where wheat, spices, and not infrequently the customs of European empires originated.
Therefore, the overthrow of the ayatollahs will not be an easy task, nor will it have merely local effects like Syria or Libya. Iran is a country that has fought wars and knows war. Naturally, it does not have the capacities of the Americans, but neither is it comparable to other states in the region. Its army is ideological. Intertwined with religious fervor, it becomes dangerous.
Iranians themselves are a people with imperial sensibilities. They know their history and are proud of it. Moreover, as leaders of the Shiite world, their influence does not end at their political borders.
Iran has also invested heavily in what is known as soft power. Intellectuals, journalists, and influential figures in the Western world have been invited as visitors or sponsored to act as a fifth column in their home countries—supporting Iran’s interests or delegitimizing governments hostile to Tehran. Albania is among the countries where investments have been made in journalists and intellectuals of this kind. It is no coincidence that such figures become hostile whenever the tenant of Dëshmorët e Kombit Boulevard has problems with the mullahs of Tehran.
For this reason, the collapse of Iran will not be easy. But if it happens, the consequences will resemble a tectonic shift—one that will shape the next fifty years.