Friedrich Merz is on the precipice of becoming Germany’s next chancellor. If successful, his conservatism and quest for new allies to secure Europe’s nuclear deterrent could create a “two-speed Europe”
By Timo Lochocki
Two things will alter Europe’s political future. First is the rise of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the high likelihood of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)’s Friedrich Merz as the next German chancellor. The second is the Donald Trump administration’s attempts to decide European security over European heads. The latter means that Europe urgently needs a security architecture—and especially its own nuclear deterrent.
In theory, France or the UK could offer their nuclear forces as a baseline. But the likelihood of either country putting these under European command—or the rest of Europe being keen on a second nuclear umbrella entirely dependent on French or British technology—is low. To do so would lead to a de facto hegemony of either states’ defence industry. And, as German politics moves to the right, Berlin’s fall as mediator will only lead to the acceleration of a “two-speed Europe.”
The end of supranationalism
A two-speed Europe, whereby member states prioritise cooperation between those of larger resources and economies, would mean the end to the supranationalism which has defined EU politics—and Germany in particular—since the 1990s. Traditionally all democratic parties pursued a pro-EU course, preferring all-encompassing solutions over intergovernmental ideas. This led to policies, such as the introduction of the euro, which embraced the ideals of nearly all member states.
But over the past 20 years, an emboldened and Europe-wide far-right movement, political divisions on migration and individual foreign policies increasingly tied to national identity politics have led to a breakdown in consensus. The quest for ongoing EU integration has stalled and Germany—once the national, pragmatic glue sticking the EU together—is following suit. While its likely next government under Merz is, on paper, centre-right, the country is threatened by the loud voices of its own anti-EU, right-wing populism. This is seen most dramatically in the rise of the AfD.
Now, as the right-wing party increases pressure on the CDU and next likely chancellor, and the question over nuclear deterrence looms, Merz is in search of strong allies with a similar outlook. Given the importance of Germany’s economy and its role in debates about a European nuclear deterrent, these changes to its domestic and foreign politics will have a large sway over EU affairs.
Embracing “Hansa 2.0”
Aside from Poland, whose political landscape is variable but often defined by extremes, the countries with a relatively weak far-right—Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands—share similar economic and security interests. They tend to have lower public debt, space for investment in innovation, feel threatened by Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and are disappointed by Trump’s Ukraine “deal.” This group of countries can be referred to as “Hansa 2.0”—although the idea was previously not impactful, since major countries like Germany were disinterested in an intergovernmental approach.
Instead, they embraced an institutionalisation of powers in Brussels, which included traditionally major EU partners such as France or Italy in favour of supranationalism.
But things have changed. Now, ideally, Spain and Portugal will accompany this Hansa 2.0 grouping. However, France, Hungary and Italy are unlikely to join due to the impact of their growing far-right political movements, and differing economic and security interests. Historically speaking, one of the most serious spats between Hansa 2.0 and southern Europe was the question of innovation funding. This haunted the EU during the eurozone crises—the looming issue of debt mutualisation to make fiscal room for further government spending to aid the European economic recovery is likely to spark tensions once again.
Treading a lonely path
Furthermore, in light of Ukrainian “peace negotiations” being undertaken by Trump and Putin over the heads of the Europeans, the need for a common European defence mechanism and nuclear deterrent is as pressing as ever.
Over the last few weeks, the US government has declined to continue to act as a provider of Europe’s security. In theory, France could seize the moment to Europeanise and modernise its nuclear capacities—but it is extremely unlikely that Emmanuel Macron will give up the country’s national command over its independent nuclear strike capabilities. Instead, France has requested that EU countries fund the modernisation of its forces and leave the command to Paris alone. This is an unappealing offer to the rest of Europe, which does not want to subjugate its security to one national player.
France’s other option—using its own technology to build a second nuclear umbrella—is also unappealing, sparking concern that this would reinforce French technological hegemony. France’s EU partners will instead demand unconstrained technology sharing. But the French appetite for Europeanisation is already low and likely to further decrease as the country’s election campaign 2027 draws closer. Any centrist candidate will be afraid of right-wing figures, such as National Rally’s Marine Le Pen, accusing them of not being “national” enough. As a result, France may fall out as a trusted security guarantor for Europe and embrace its own intergovernmental path without Germany.
Germany holds the chips
Should the incoming German government adopt a progressive approach—only achievable in the unlikely scenario that progressive parties hold a parliamentary majority—it could enter unbiased nuclear conversations with Paris. But in light of current circumstances, any form of “Hansa 2.0” will likely discuss developing its own nuclear deterrent that buys technology not only from France, but also from the UK, the US—and maybe even Israel (if only to have an alternative at hand to increase bargaining power with France).
Judging by Merz’s political track record, he seems interested in neither slow and long-lasting negotiations, nor by wooing France. Instead, observers can expect an overarching security and innovation consensus reaching from the Balkans and over Poland to Germany, ending up in the Netherlands and Scandinavia
In such a scenario, the passionately pro-central European Merz is the key accelerator. Judging by his political track record, he seems interested in neither slow and long-lasting negotiations; nor by wooing France. Instead, observers can expect an overarching security and innovation consensus reaching from the Balkans and over Poland to Germany, ending up in the Netherlands and Scandinavia. In an ideal scenario, the substantial integration leaps in innovation funding and conventional and nuclear defence made by Hansa 2.0 will lead to spill-over effects where France, Italy and Hungary join their efforts.
In the worst case, it will lead to an institutionalisation of a two-speed Europe. Here, the Hansa 2.0 approach will define one highly integrated camp, with mediterranean southern Europe lagging behind.
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Such divergence between Germany and France increases the chance of a two-speed Europe defined by different degrees of liberal democracy, debt-financed innovation potential, and mutual nuclear deterrent. A chance to prevent this lies with a huge package deal, meaning the EU’s two largest member states need to overcome their greatest inner-European grievances. If Germany accepts debt mutualisation for innovation—something German conservatives have fought against—France might Europeanise its nuclear forces. But history shows that both events are unlikely.
A Hansa 2.0. which includes the Baltics, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Scandinavia seems instead to be looming. A conservative German chancellor in Friedrich Merz could be the prime accelerator.
Source: The European Council on Foreign Relations
