By Denko Maleski
What will our fate be without America the “reconciler”? This is a question being asked across Europe, but it should concern us in the Balkans in particular. In the unipolar moment of world politics that is now behind us, a series of bridges of cooperation among warring Balkan peoples were built through the military and diplomatic interventions of the world’s sole great power. In Macedonia alone, three such bridges were constructed: the Ohrid Agreement, the Prespa Agreement, and the Treaty of Good Neighborliness with Bulgaria.
Unaccepted by the majority of both peoples, in one text I described the Prespa Agreement as a “bridge built over two nationalisms, the Macedonian and the Greek.” Now, this sounds a bit poetic to me and—given the rise of the nationalist right at home, in Europe, and in America—it makes me wonder about the durability of such bridges built without popular enthusiasm on either side of the border. And, of course, about the need for current politicians to work on strengthening them.
Measured by the same yardstick, one could say that a similar bridge of cooperation over Macedonian and Albanian nationalism was constructed with the Ohrid Agreement, by NATO. The American “reconciler” imposed that one as well. Despite the obvious benefits reflected in the peace between Macedonians and Albanians that has lasted for 25 years, there is still no shared interpretation of the roots of the 2001 war. It would be worthwhile to invest effort in finally settling that issue too.
The details surrounding the drafting of the two agreements—the Ohrid and the Prespa—are known, including from the testimonies of their authors. The third bridge of cooperation, which, despite the signed treaty, has still not truly been put into operation, is the one on good neighborliness and cooperation with Bulgaria. It is curious that, although the subject of so much controversy, little is known about the process of creating this agreement. How did it come to the negotiating table, who took part in drafting it, what was the role of the international factor, who proposed what on each side of the table, and—most importantly—who is the author of what the current authorities in Skopje consider the stumbling block in relations between the two states: the shared history.
And once again: what will happen to these bridges after America’s withdrawal from Europe and the dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy? Time will tell. But one thing seems certain to me: without the liberal hegemon America and in the absence of accession negotiations with the EU, the internal political balance in Macedonia has already shifted in favor of nationalists. The deficit among voters that the Social Democrats created for themselves while building—together with the West—bridges across Balkan nationalisms, but also across Macedonian nationalism toward Albanians and Greeks, cost them an electoral defeat. As a rule, assuming power makes politicians more responsible. New politicians are no longer merely representatives of their ideology or their voters, but of the state as a whole. That necessarily makes their policies more moderate. Moreover, while in opposition you can promise anything, in power decisions carry a concrete price. The price called peace and security for the state is too high for radical experiments with what has already been built.