Veton Surroi
European Leaders and the Atlantic Puzzle
The European leaders of states and institutions, now confronted with a new and publicly expressed reality of American politics—without diplomatic finesse or gloves—must adapt to this new reality by formulating a unified response. Not for specific issues or individual states, but for a fundamental enigma that emerges from analyzing an equation with multiple unknowns: What will become of the 80-year-old idea of the Euro-Atlantic community if its “Atlantic” component fades to the point of erasure?
1.
Perhaps the best way to understand the immense geopolitical shifts taking place within the first month of Trump’s second presidency is to bypass emotions—whether surprise, disbelief, or others—that may serve as an excuse for avoiding the facts.
From the perspective of a man trained to suppress emotions and exclude them from analysis and decision-making—Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin—President Trump will be his guest on May 9 in Red Square, celebrating the 80th anniversary of victory over Nazism. By then, if President Trump intends to stand in Red Square, the U.S. and Russia must reach an agreement on Ukraine—essentially normalizing relations between the two powers.
From President Putin’s perspective, Russia must secure recognition of the territory it has acquired militarily (roughly one-sixth of Ukraine), security guarantees (denying Ukraine’s NATO membership and preventing any Western defense pact modeled after NATO’s Article 5), and the lifting of isolating sanctions against Russia.
In his view, he has already achieved two of these strategic objectives. Last week in Munich, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declared that returning Ukraine to its 2014 borders is unrealistic and that Ukraine’s NATO membership is off the table.
There is another perceived achievement for President Putin—perhaps a matter of perception, perhaps a strategic reality: the withdrawal of the U.S. as Europe’s primary security guarantor. For Putin, this marks a return to a 19th-century geopolitical balance, where Moscow stood as an equal power alongside London, Paris, and Vienna, and where European peace was maintained through a balance of forces—what was once known as the Concert of Europe.
The third point—one he is now prepared to negotiate (since the first two are settled)—is the normalization of U.S.-Russia relations, which, naturally, involves the territory between them: Europe.
2.
From President Trump’s perspective, Russia is a power whose natural resources and nuclear arsenal must not be allowed to drift toward China. Western support for Ukraine, including economic sanctions against Russia, has pushed Moscow into Beijing’s arms. Trump’s instincts, repeatedly expressed publicly, tell him that ending the war must result in a scenario where Russia is closer to the U.S. than to China—one that includes strategic American investments in Russia’s energy and other key resources.
Thus, the war’s resolution must ensure normalized U.S.-Russia relations, transfer the burden of Ukraine’s fate primarily onto Europe, and, along with it, shift Europe’s overall security burden onto European states themselves.
On the geostrategic scale, these objectives are far clearer than a war in which the front lines resemble those of World War I—months of fighting for the sake of moving the battle lines by a few kilometers in either direction.
A debate over this approach unfolded among the thinkers behind Project 2025, a blueprint for Trump’s second administration. Between two schools of thought—one advocating for continued support for Ukraine as a means of weakening Russia, and another calling for a withdrawal of support—the latter prevailed:
“Another school of conservative thought denies that U.S. support for Ukraine is in America’s national security interest. Ukraine is not a NATO member and is among the most corrupt countries in the region. European nations directly affected by the conflict should assist in Ukraine’s defense, but the U.S. should not continue its involvement. This viewpoint seeks a swift end to the conflict through a negotiated settlement between Ukraine and Russia.”
3.
From the perspective of major European states—Britain and EU countries—last week, through cold calculation, should have been the clearest message they have ever received from the U.S.
In security policy, the message was that Europe must take care of its own security, including Ukraine. In trade policy, reciprocity in tariffs was established with individual states, calling into question the existing transatlantic liberal trade system. In values, Vice President J.D. Vance delivered a speech that made it clear that his conservative platform sees nearly all of Europe as center-left—except for Germany’s AfD and its ideological allies under Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán’s banner, Make Europe Great Again (MEGA).
The European response, as always, is slow—caught somewhere between surprise, disbelief, and the search for accommodation to this new reality.
The position of President Trump’s envoys may have been shocking, especially given how quickly it was presented, but it is a stance that has emerged from a broader debate. In Project 2025, it states:
“Transform NATO so that U.S. allies can sustain most of the conventional forces needed to deter Russia, relying on the United States primarily for our nuclear deterrence… thus reducing the presence of U.S. forces in Europe.”
This is framed within a particular worldview, one that declares:
“The region of Europe, Eurasia, and Russia consists of relatively wealthy and technologically advanced societies, which should be expected to bear their fair share of both security needs and global security architecture. The United States cannot be expected to provide a security umbrella for countries unwilling to contribute appropriately.”
4.
By February 2025, one of the most dramatic geopolitical realignments in Europe, the Euro-Atlantic relationship, and potentially global affairs has begun. The first phase kicked off in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during an initial high-level meeting between U.S. and Russian delegations—an engagement that will intensify over the next two months, culminating in Victory Day (Europe’s), which President Putin has turned into a test deadline.
European leaders—of states and institutions—now face a stark new reality in American politics, one expressed openly, without diplomatic niceties. They must adapt by crafting a unified response—not on individual issues or for specific countries, but to address the larger enigma posed by an equation with multiple unknowns:
What will become of the 80-year-old idea of the Euro-Atlantic community if its “Atlantic” component is eroded to the point of disappearance?/ Koha.net
