The commonality between them lies in their effort to overthrow violent regimes without resorting to violence, while their distinction lies in their approach to politics.
By Xhelal Neziri
“Today, I can inform you of the following: The Soviet Union has decided to reduce its armed forces. Over the next two years, their numbers will decrease by 500,000 personnel, and the volume of conventional weapons will also be significantly reduced. These reductions will be unilateral, unrelated to the Vienna mandate negotiations.”
This is the key excerpt from the speech of former Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev, delivered at the UN headquarters in New York on December 7, 1988. These words marked the beginning of a historic transformation in Europe, where Central and Eastern Europe would ultimately free itself from communism and commence the democratization process.
In this speech, Gorbachev announced that, in agreement with their allies in the Warsaw Pact, Moscow had decided to withdraw six tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and complete their mission by 1991. It was good news for the citizens of Eastern Europe but bad news for the puppet governments of those countries. Without Russian soldiers, the communist leaders of these nations became vulnerable, defenseless, and fearful of their people. This historic speech marked the beginning of movements aimed at replacing the one-party system with a multiparty system, establishing democracy as a form of state governance. These developments contributed to significant changes in Europe’s map, where the number of countries grew from 9 in 1989 to 27 in the 1990s.
Simultaneously, Gorbachev announced the restructuring of the Soviet Union’s political and economic system under the “perestroika” and “glasnost” initiatives. This led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a federation of states with different ethnicities. The same federal model applied to the creation of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, both of which also dissolved in the ensuing years.
Antipolitics and Protagonism
In this historic transition and wave of democratization in Europe, two atypical figures stand out: Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia and Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo. The common thread between them is their effort to overthrow violent regimes nonviolently, but their distinction lies in their approach to politics.
In Czechoslovakia, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, students and artists led protests against police brutality. The regime fell and handed power to a provisional government led by Václav Havel, the most prominent opposition leader in civil society. Unlike Hungary, Czechoslovakia did not achieve transition through negotiations. After ten days of public demonstrations, the regime simply collapsed. The provisional government, born of the Velvet Revolution, had strong antipolitical tendencies and rejected the possibility of developing political parties across the country. Additionally, it was not interested in changing the fictive Soviet-style federal constitution, which made it impossible to save the federation. This resulted in the peaceful dissolution of the federation, giving rise to two independent states: the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Conversely, Yugoslavia’s dissolution was not peaceful. Wars began in Slovenia in the early 1990s and ended in Kosovo in 1999. Unlike Havel, who faced a regime unprotected by Russia and unwilling to suppress protests, Rugova faced a repressive and brutal regime led by the infamous Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević. Given Milošević’s thirst for war, destruction, and suffering, Rugova had no choice but to abandon antipolitical convictions. Although he had a literary background like Havel, Rugova could not avoid engaging in politics. Politics, in fact, engaged him, swept him into its currents, and held him until his last breath.
Havel led protests organized by civil society. Unlike Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Croatia, and Slovenia, where protests were directed by a consolidated opposition that later assumed power, Czechoslovakia’s protests lacked such structured leadership. Numerous groups emerged in 1988 and 1989, besides the “Charter 77” movement, but none could be considered an organized political opposition. Jan Urban, a notable dissident in “Charter 77,” observed at the brink of Slovakia’s separation that opposition groups believed in the regime’s invincibility until it collapsed: “We did not know how to organize a political opposition… Due to our antipolitical stance, we were certain we would lose—unless we changed.”
On the other hand, Rugova had a clear political vision and was the main political protagonist, not only in Kosovo but also across the Albanian geography in former Yugoslavia. Unable to remain apolitical, Rugova became the architect of Kosovo as an independent state, with a political identity distinct from Albania. Besides promoting the project of the Kosovar state, he also selected its national symbols—flag, anthem, and emblem. In this aspect, Rugova’s vision differed from that of Albanian illegal movements, which fought for the unification of Albanians into one state. As a man of letters and former president of the Kosovo Writers’ Association, Rugova hesitated to support Albanian military formations even when it was widely expected. During the peace talks in Rambouillet and Paris in 1999, Rugova—almost voluntarily—stepped back from leading the independence efforts, confident that Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leader Hashim Thaçi was on the path to realizing his vision. This was thought to mark the beginning of his political end, but the opposite occurred. In the elections organized after the war, Rugova’s LDK party consistently achieved sweeping victories.
Rugova Greater than Havel
Rugova passed away in 2006, and two years later, Kosovo declared independence. Havel retired from politics in 2003 and died eight years later. Both were passionate smokers. Rugova began his aesthetic resistance two years before Havel, never reconciling with the violent measures imposed by the Serbian regime embodied in Milošević.
There is another difference between the two protagonists of Europe’s democratic transition: after the revolution, Havel lost support domestically but gained it globally, while Rugova’s popularity steadily grew, both domestically and internationally.
If Havel’s transition was peaceful and lasted a year, Rugova led Kosovo through a painful transition involving continuous resistance and the internationalization of Kosovo’s issue. Unlike the Czech Republic, Kosovo has a painful historical trajectory marked by many struggles to establish its unique historical, political, and cultural identity.
Considering these comparisons, it can be concluded that Rugova is a figure who surpasses Havel. His lack of promotion unjustly diminishes him in the eyes of public opinion, where the peaceful overthrow of communism is often solely attributed to the Czech leader.