By Eugen Cakolli
Today’s ruling by the Constitutional Court of Kosovo reaffirmed several principles regarding constitutional deadlines, particularly in relation to the election of the president. Not because these principles were unclear before, but because, once again, there was an attempt to misuse constitutional provisions for political justification.
First, the issue of the decree. The reason why the court did not qualify it as an unconstitutional act, but merely as a decision without legal effect, is directly linked to the logic of deadlines. In essence, the court accepts that the 30-day deadline is binding and that failing to respect it carries consequences. However, it clarifies that this consequence is not triggered directly by that deadline, but through Article 82 — that is, through the 60-day deadline and dissolution ex constitutione. In other words, this is not a rejection of the logic used by President Vjosa Osmani, but a correction of how it was applied.
Second, and this is the key point, the court definitively closes the “dilemma” between the 30-day and 60-day deadlines. They are not two separate timelines, but a single mechanism. The 60-day deadline operates in function of the 30-day one. This means the procedure must begin much earlier. One cannot wait until the final day of the 30-day period, claim the process has started, and then seek an additional 60 days. Put simply, the total is 60 days, with the final 30 days being a closed window that cannot be exceeded.
Third, the court sets a clear standard. Constitutional time does not begin when parliament chooses to act, but when it is capable of acting. That is why, in this case, there are no new 60 days, but only the remaining time from a deadline that had already started earlier — one that was constrained by the fact that parliament had not yet been constituted in a way that would allow full use of the constitutional timeframe.
Ultimately, this is a decision that both balances the situation and buys time for institutions to complete the process. More importantly, responsibility remains with institutions and parliamentary parties to carry out constitutional processes on time, rather than adapting them to suit political circumstances.