By Ditmir Bushati
The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, also Vice President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, when asked by journalists at the press conference in Tirana about the possibility of Albania joining the EU in 2030, emphasized: “It is a realistic objective, but in order to achieve it, certain steps need to be taken, and Albania must adopt and implement reforms in practice.”
During her first visit to Albania, as part of a regional tour, Kaja Kallas politely reminded us of two of the most elementary aspects of the enlargement process.
First, this process involves three actors: the EU member states (the decision-makers); the European Commission (the driving force of the integration process and, at the same time, the closest ally of the candidate country); and the candidate country aspiring to join (in this case, Albania).
Second, reforms can only be fulfilled by creating an inclusive political climate.
It is worth recalling that, during Albania’s NATO accession process, beyond the geopolitical circumstances, political consensus for the adoption and implementation of reforms in the fields of security and the rule of law was decisive. Within the EU membership context, this takes on even greater importance, as—unlike NATO—this process directly impacts nearly every field of life.
EU membership is a national objective that transcends political parties. This is even more true in Albania’s case, where our connection to Europe has been and remains organic. Europe has been a kind of spiritual hearth for Albanians since the times of the Balshas. Or, as Ismail Kadare said: “a natural state of ours.”
Kaja Kallas deserves to be acknowledged for the honesty with which she conveyed her messages—something not always typical of Brussels officials—avoiding the spread of false illusions, which the Albanian people certainly do not need. I recall those EU officials who, immediately after the publication of the 2018 Enlargement Strategy, declared 2025 as a possible accession date for Montenegro and Serbia. Such sweet-sounding but empty predictions require no further elaboration.
Due to geopolitical reasons—especially those related to the war in Ukraine—EU enlargement has returned to the political agenda. However, the realization of this process remains unresolved, as the EU itself faces countless internal governance challenges. Thus, Kaja Kallas rightly referred to the steps that must be taken, primarily by the EU member states. On the other hand, we must understand that the member states will not accept new members solely on geopolitical grounds, neglecting the fulfillment of rule of law and good governance reforms.
IF THEY FAIL THERE, THEY WILL FAIL EVERYWHERE
Although it’s been over two years since the EU member states requested that the European Commission prepare a document for internal EU reform in light of enlargement, they are still not ready for this discussion—nor for a final EU vision.
Not all EU member states share the same vision of how the EU should function in order to allow for the accession of new candidates—including Albania—under the new geopolitical context, where it must act as a major global player alongside the USA, China, Russia, and India.
France and Germany, traditionally seen as the EU’s driving forces, best reflect this reality. A few weeks after Russia invaded Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron presented his vision for a European Political Community, believing that “the EU cannot remain the sole platform for structuring the European continent.” This is a recycled idea from former President François Mitterrand, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, intended to prevent a massive and rapid expansion of the EU with states newly emerged from communism.
In both cases, France’s underlying concern was to avoid enlargement. For this reason, the European Political Community seeks to create “strategic intimacy” among European states facing Russian aggression. But in reality, it has been reduced to a platform for dialogue—where states can discuss matters together without necessarily sharing common values or goals—far from being a European forum for decision-making.
On the other hand, the outgoing German government had pledged to accelerate the EU accession process for the Western Balkans. Four years later, it is impossible to consider this promise fulfilled. The draft agreement of the future governing coalition between CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats refers to enlargement as a “geopolitical necessity” and supports a policy of “gradual integration,” but offers no concrete commitments or timelines for the conclusion of accession negotiations or acceptance of new states. The agreement text defines EU consolidation through reform as a prerequisite for any potential enlargement.
Not all EU member states are willing to contribute financially or to give up financial benefits in a larger EU. That’s why, in the report drafted by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta—“For the Future of the EU Internal Market”—a solidarity mechanism is proposed to soften the fears of net beneficiary countries regarding the potential accession of Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova.
Not all EU member states agree on whether countries under occupation or involved in unresolved conflicts can be part of the EU. Not all are willing to sacrifice social welfare packages or spend more on security.
It’s worth mentioning that in Mario Draghi’s widely discussed report—“On the Future of Europe’s Competitiveness”—the Western Balkans are not mentioned at all with regard to enlargement. In fact, the term “enlargement” is used in the past tense, not the future. The €800 billion sum that Draghi sees as necessary for Europe to become competitive is immense compared to the €6 billion offered to the Western Balkans through the Growth Plan—an amount that does not bridge the developmental gap between the EU and the region.
This year, work begins on drafting the EU’s multiannual budget, which will also serve as a political indicator of enlargement readiness. It remains to be seen whether Letta and Draghi’s proposals for the EU and aspiring countries will be harmonized within this framework.
Despite the new geopolitical context and the proposals mentioned above, we must acknowledge that the “enlargement engine”—with its motivational power for candidate countries—remains switched off. The EU member states hold the keys to restart this engine, just as the candidate countries have the ability to use the conditionality of the process as an opportunity to reform governance and improve quality of life.
The famous song “New York, New York” says: “If I can make it there, I’ll make it anywhere.” The opposite holds true in the case of enlargement: the EU member states must realize that “if they can’t succeed with the Western Balkans, they won’t succeed anywhere.”
The sooner there is consensus on this point, the easier the job will be for the European Commission. In the absence of a green light from EU member states, the Commission has shown creativity in keeping the process alive. Nevertheless, this is not enough to foster democratic transformation and socio-economic development in candidate countries.
TRUTH IS THE BEST WAY FORWARD
Is the year 2030 a realistic objective for Albania’s EU accession? This question brings to mind May 1st, 2004, when we held a debate at the Academy of Arts in Tirana with ambassadors from countries that had just joined the EU. To the audience’s question—“When will Albania join the EU?”—we optimistically replied: “perhaps within a decade,” disappointing those who viewed even a decade as a distant horizon, not a tangible goal.
Similarly, on June 12th, 2006, when Albania signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement—which remains the cornerstone of our relationship with the EU—I responded to a national TV station’s question on EU membership: “if everything goes as planned in the agreement, within a decade.”
In truth, our path toward the EU since 1990 has been a rocky one—far from justifying the public enthusiasm and support for the process. It is deeply tied to the challenge of democratic state-building, reflecting the weaknesses of our democratic tradition, the difficulty in cultivating core European values like rule of law, extreme polarization, and unilateral violations of political norms.
We missed an opportunity in the early 1990s, another in the early 2000s. It took us over three years to conclude the SAA negotiations, five years to gain candidate status, and thirteen years to begin accession talks.
The same can be said for absorbing EU funds in the form of grants—where Albania ranks second to last, ahead only of Bosnia and Herzegovina—or European investments via loans and grants, where we are on par with North Macedonia and behind Montenegro and Kosovo.
We’ve lost a lot of time along the way. And more often than not, we’ve been our own biggest obstacle.
This history is not merely a lesson from the past—it is the key to facing the challenges of today and foreseeing the future. In this context, setting a timeline for EU accession—such as 2030—without a broad, inclusive platform to accelerate democratic state-building reforms and absorb EU funds, is, at best, to pretend the (im)possible.
