Eugen Cakolli, a long-time analyst at the Kosovo Democratic Institute (KDI) and at Transparency International (TI), warns that Kosovo’s political deadlock is not just a procedural issue, but a reflection of deeper institutional decay. “The deadlock in the Assembly is not just a result of constitutional ambiguities or procedural misunderstandings, it’s a mirror of the country’s fragile political culture.”
In this exclusive interview for BalkanView, Cakolli criticizes the instrumentalization of constitutional processes and calls for a new political culture to restore functionality. “The problem doesn’t lie strictly in the Constitution itself—although it’s far from perfect—but in the clash between its normative expectations and the political reality on the ground.”
Cakolli has been part of the KDI team since 2016, working on parliamentary oversight and electoral transparency. He previously worked with IFES and coordinated election observers under the Democracy in Action initiative. Currently, he is a project officer focusing on first-time voters and pursuing a master’s degree in European Integration and Public Administration at the University of Pristina.
Interview by: Lorik Idrizi
BalkanView: How do you interpret the current deadlock in the Kosovo Assembly? How can the country escape this vicious cycle?
Cakolli: The deadlock in the Assembly is not just a result of constitutional ambiguities or procedural misunderstandings, it’s a mirror of the country’s fragile political culture. Despite relatively clear legal mechanisms for forming the Assembly and ensuring institutional continuity, political actors have shown little will to implement these provisions both in letter and in spirit. Rather than building institutional consensus, many actions have been geared toward delays and manipulation of rules for short-term political gain.
This vicious cycle—where crises are tackled with formal constitutional tools without addressing the underlying problem of political unwillingness to cooperate—has turned institutional formation into a tool of pressure, rather than a natural part of democratic transition. Exiting this impasse requires more than legal interpretation. I believe it demands a political agreement, not just to resolve this crisis, but to set a new standard of institutional behavior where rules serve as a mechanism of stability.
BalkanView: Are there constitutional gaps in Kosovo that allow repeated delays in forming the Assembly?
Cakolli: The problem doesn’t lie strictly in the Constitution itself—although it’s far from perfect—but in the clash between its normative expectations and the political reality on the ground. Like most parliamentary systems, Kosovo’s Constitution assumes that actors will behave rationally and uphold institutional functionality. It also assumes that disagreements will be addressed through compromise to preserve balance and legitimacy.
However, recurring blockades—in forming institutions or passing legislation—have shown that this assumption is fragile in Kosovo’s political context. The Constitution is not necessarily permissive of stagnation, but it can be misused when actors disregard it or weaponize its ambiguities. Combined with a culture of institutional sabotage, these gaps have turned the Constitution from a guardian of democratic order into a tool of delay.
BalkanView: Why is the formation of institutions being delayed? Is Vetëvendosje buying time, or is there a deeper strategy?
Cakolli: Delays in forming institutions can’t be viewed in isolation from the strategic calculations of parties—especially Vetëvendosje, which came out first in the last election. Still, the delay isn’t merely the result of a single-party strategy. It’s the product of internal tensions, political arithmetic, and fear of losing control if the process slips out of hand.
There’s certainly a possibility that this dynamic is being used to buy time—whether for internal restructuring, testing public opinion, or assessing the international response. But at its core, the delay reflects a distorted view of institutions. Instead of functioning as platforms for representation and decision-making, institutions are now bargaining tools in inter-party negotiations.
This behavior is part of a broader political pattern in Kosovo—avoiding difficult decisions by maintaining ambiguity and status quo, rather than taking responsibility. The absence of a clear institutional roadmap is as problematic as the deadlock itself.
BalkanView: Is it possible the country could face snap elections?
Cakolli: Under normal circumstances, early elections are triggered when a government’s mandate ends prematurely, when a parliamentary majority is lost, or when MPs vote to dissolve the Assembly. But the current crisis is pre-institutional—the Assembly hasn’t even been constituted. This creates a constitutional dilemma that hasn’t yet been fully addressed: what happens when the Assembly cannot be formed within the mandated timeframe and no institution holds full legitimacy?
The Constitution doesn’t explicitly foresee this situation, nor does it specify what happens if deadlines are breached. The Constitutional Court has previously interpreted these deadlines as binding and stressed the need for institutional continuity. But if the Assembly fails to form beyond this deadline, Kosovo enters an institutional vacuum.
In such a case, the only viable way out would be a Constitutional Court ruling, interpreting the failure to constitute the Assembly as the expiration of the constitutional mandate. That could authorize the President to call new elections to restore institutional functionality. In such a scenario, the judiciary would not just be a legal arbiter, but a safeguard for institutional survival.
BalkanView: Since no Kosovo–Serbia dialogue meetings have taken place since September 2023, can the process be described as being in “clinical death”?
Cakolli: With no functional Assembly, the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue has continued without transparency or oversight since the previous legislature expired. After the elections, two meetings were held in Brussels—on June 2 and June 10, 2025. In both cases, acting Deputy Prime Minister Besnik Bislimi represented Kosovo, despite the government having only a caretaker mandate.
These meetings focused on implementing existing agreements and potentially advancing new steps in the dialogue process. But without a functioning Assembly to oversee these commitments, the process lacks fundamental democratic standards like transparency and accountability. This raises doubts about the legitimacy and durability of the commitments made.