By Ben Andoni
Society predates the state, and literature suggests that much remains to be explored by historians and anthropologists—a process that continues to be enriched everywhere by scholars’ perspectives. Today, we find ourselves at a stage where the Albanian state is consolidated, with both its strengths and weaknesses, navigating survival in a continent marked by wars. But can our society influence politics and reshape it in its own interest? So far, it has failed.
A society consists of a body of individuals bound by functional interdependence, often characterized by elements such as national or cultural identity, social solidarity, language, or hierarchical structures, as literature describes. So why has our society failed to build a strong state?
Bringing it into a more contemporary context: In public and political discourse (mostly from the opposition), Rama’s power today is considered absolute. He is accused of autocratic tendencies, which, in fact, he openly demonstrates with the absolute authority he wields over the government and most other political institutions. His government’s intervention in the economy and various other sectors is also visibly pervasive. The result is painful—not just socially but in a realm where we are increasingly sensitive: our country performs worse than many in the Balkans in the “Absence of Corruption” indicator, ranking 107th, reflecting high levels of corruption according to the 2024 Rule of Law Index published by the World Justice Project.
Not to draw a direct comparison but rather to examine a developing country that started from a deficit: India. This vast nation—far removed from us both geographically and culturally—continues to attract the attention of economic specialists as it sustains its rapid growth. A country with proverbial poverty, containing three Nigerias within it—over 300 million people living on less than a dollar a day, according to a reference from a decade ago, as Fareed Zakaria notes in The Post-American World—has managed to foster its own Silicon Valleys. Its poverty has not disappeared, yet it is developing at a remarkable pace. Democracy, institutions, and the English language, a legacy of British rule, serve as the driving forces behind its economy.
In his Independence Day speech, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a bold promise just months before securing his third term in 2024: India will become a developed economy by 2047, marking its centennial as an independent nation. The country, he declared, has three major advantages: “demography, democracy, and diversity.”
Modi’s famous 3Ds, however, do not translate easily to Albania—at least in terms of demographic diversity, as we are a country predominantly composed of ethnic Albanians, with minority groups in much smaller numbers. Meanwhile, Albanians are leaving en masse. Albania’s population has not only shrunk but has aged by seven years between 2011 and 2023. According to the 2023 Census, of the 103,000 people living alone, 62.5% (or about 64,375 individuals) were over the age of 60 (Monitor, 2025).
As for democracy, Albania does not score well in the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Transformation Index. It is categorized as a “defective democracy,” though it receives better evaluations for economic transformation and governance. In political transformation, Albania ranks 21st, while Kosovo stands at 37th among 137 developing and transition economies, based on criteria such as the rule of law, institutional stability, political participation, and societal integration (DW, 2024).
Albanian society is failing to confront corruption because trust in its moral institutions has long since eroded. There is little faith in public officials; the state itself often acts mercilessly toward its citizens; and the administration remains deeply flawed. Even though religious belief is growing, the moral compass that should stem from faith is far from fostering a strong rule-based state. In Albania, corruption is not seen as a sin but as a skill—something evident in the ostentatious wealth flaunted by many. Our state actively favors businesses and individuals who disregard parity and the rule of law.
When it comes to economic diversity, the picture is bleak. The economy is disproportionately dependent on tourism and construction, neglecting other sectors, including agriculture. And yet, Albania holds potential for attracting foreign investment thanks to its natural beauty, strategic location, and low labor costs—though in reality, these low costs are often tied to informality. Experts note that investors are frequently deterred by bureaucracy, corruption, and an unpredictable tax system.
“Albania has undergone significant economic transformation in recent years. As economies develop, the role of low-value-added sectors diminishes while more sophisticated sectors gain prominence. To sustain economic growth, Albania needs diversification and greater sophistication,” says Ekaterina Solovova, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) resident representative in Albania. However, these aspirations are hindered by informality and a deeply rooted distrust in the state.
“Even though a draft strategy for revenue collection is being promoted as part of a new approach aimed at stabilizing tax policies and avoiding frequent legal changes, past initiatives driven by political and electoral motivations have shown otherwise,” studies suggest (Altax, 2025).
Albania is making headlines for its airports and ports, but infrastructure problems—often a burden on the economy—are plainly visible, with persistent traffic congestion. Albanian society fails to raise its voice over such issues, nor over the lack of clean water, nor the empty promises made during electoral campaigns, including this one in 2025.
Our workforce—once the backbone of the economic model two decades ago—now lacks the necessary skills for high-value-added sectors. Wage growth, driven by emigration rather than productivity, has caught industries off guard, causing Albania to lose its key competitive edge: cheap labor (Monitor, 2025). Similarly, state intervention and inconsistency have created significant issues in education—particularly in aligning curricula with labor market needs and in training workers for emerging industries. The refrain is often heard: there are jobs, but no professionals.
Perhaps the accelerated pace of European integration could create an opportunity to focus more on education, agriculture, and trade. However, real progress would require long-term strategies, something our society fails to demand. Instead, the dominant discourse remains fixated on Rama vs. Berisha and their endless promises—an unchanging political landscape that fails to offer a fresh vision for the country.
And so, we return to India. The country’s great fortune has been, and continues to be, its deeply rooted democracy—just as in the United States, as Zakaria notes, where society has managed to assert dominance over the state. But can Albanian society in 2025 develop the maturity needed to replace the state? Unfortunately, so far, the state has prevailed over society. Rama-Berisha & Co are merely the faces of a system that is driving Albanians away—never to return. (Homo Albanicus)
This translation maintains the author’s analytical style and critical tone while ensuring clarity and fluency in English. Let me know if you need any refinements!
