Bosnia and Herzegovina chose independence at a time when the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had already ceased to exist, experts tell DW. But was that the only option?

The Path to Independence

“March 1 was our destiny, and it is inappropriate—perhaps even wrong—to ask whether things could have been different. We would not be who we are today if we had chosen submission in the name of questionable security,” said Alija Izetbegović, the first president of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina’s presidency.

At the time, “submission” meant remaining in what some referred to as a “shortened” Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, and potentially other republics that had not yet declared independence. Slovenia and Croatia had already broken away.

Decades later, in a country divided into two entities and home to three constituent peoples, the question remains: Could things have unfolded differently? While most Bosniaks and Croats supported independence, many Bosnian Serbs believed Yugoslavia should have been preserved—even in its diminished form.

Stjepan Kljujić: A Critical Voice on the Referendum

Stjepan Kljujić, the former president of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a former member of the presidency, describes March 1 as one of the most significant dates in the country’s modern history. A critic of Izetbegović, Kljujić does not hesitate to assign blame for the dissolution of Yugoslavia, pointing to the Serbian leadership under Slobodan Milošević.

“The breakup of Yugoslavia began at the 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1991, when Milošević disrupted proceedings, prompting Slovenes and Croats to walk out. He opposed all Slovenian proposals for reforming both the Communist League and the federation itself,” Kljujić told DW.

He argues that the Badinter Commission—a European arbitration body—then recommended a referendum to determine Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future.

Could the Referendum Have Had Greater Support?

In the 1992 referendum, 64% of citizens voted in favor of “a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, a state of equal citizens—Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, and others.”

Kljujić believes that, without obstruction from the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), as much as 80% of the population would have voted for independence. “Many urban Serbs supported an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina,” he said, adding that opposition to the referendum was strong—even from Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, who had an understanding with Milošević about Bosnia’s partition.

Despite this, Kljujić says that the Catholic Church backed the referendum after he met with Cardinal Franjo Kuharić. “In 1992, Bosnian Croats responded en masse to the call to vote,” he added.

A “Shortened Yugoslavia”: A Missed Opportunity?

Serbian politician and legal scholar Petar Kunić recalls that Milošević had offered Bosnian politicians Adil Zulfikarpašić and Muhamed Filipović a model of a “shortened Yugoslavia” that would include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and possibly Macedonia.

“Zulfikarpašić and Filipović accepted the proposal, but it was ultimately rejected by Izetbegović after U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann intervened,” Kunić said.

He believes this rejection contributed to the conflicts that followed. However, he acknowledges that Bosnia’s Croats were unwilling to consider any version of Yugoslavia, as they were already aligned with independent Croatia. “Perhaps there was a chance for autonomy for Bosnian Croats within that ‘shortened Yugoslavia,’ but such a model was never on the table,” Kunić noted.

The Role of International Negotiations

Miro Lazović, former speaker of the Bosnian parliament and a negotiator in the Dayton Peace Accords, recalls that various proposals to preserve Yugoslavia were made in the lead-up to the referendum.

“I initiated a proposal that became the basis for a platform developed by Izetbegović and Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, advocating a confederal Yugoslavia. But Milošević and Tuđman rejected it,” Lazović told DW.

The Unavoidable Break

Lazović insists that the referendum was a democratic act and not a trigger for war. “The war had already begun, both in Croatia and in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, even before the referendum. Remember the Yugoslav National Army’s attack on the village of Ravno in 1991,” he said.

He argues that Bosnia and Herzegovina paid the highest price in the dissolution of Yugoslavia but remains an independent state and a member of the United Nations.

“As for Yugoslavia, I regret that it wasn’t preserved. It was a good project for all its peoples—especially for Serbs, who could only live in a single state within Yugoslavia,” Lazović said.

Despite discussions of alternative paths, Bosnia’s fate was ultimately decided beyond its borders. “Milošević was only interested in a ‘Greater Serbia,’ and Tuđman was aligned with his own nationalist agenda. The idea of a ‘shortened Yugoslavia’ was never a real option because it would have included only occupied parts of Croatia, like Krajina and Western Slavonia,” Lazović concluded.

A Defining Moment

March 1, 1992, marked a turning point in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s modern history. The independence referendum signaled the end of an era and the beginning of another—one filled with the challenges of state-building, war, and the eventual Dayton Accords.