Serbia’s student-led election victory has ended 14 years of political dominance, but six prominent political observers warn that dismantling entrenched institutions, resolving the Kosovo dispute and defining the country’s foreign policy could prove more difficult than defeating Aleksandar Vučić.
BELGRADE/SKOPJE, Nov. 3, 2026 (BalkanView) — Serbia’s student-backed electoral victory has raised hopes of a democratic transformation after more than a decade of rule by Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party, but six prominent political observers warn that the country’s future remains uncertain, with disagreements over Kosovo, Russia and the direction of the incoming government threatening to complicate the transition.
Interviews conducted by BalkanView reveal broad agreement that the October 25 parliamentary election represents a political turning point. Yet the analysts differ over how quickly Serbia can rebuild its institutions, whether it will move decisively towards the European Union and how far the new government will depart from Belgrade’s established policies.
The Student List won 52.65% of the vote, compared with 39.22% for the alliance led by Vučić, according to preliminary results previously reported by BalkanView. The movement is projected to secure around 140 seats in Serbia’s 250-member parliament.
Political analyst Dušan Janjić sees an opportunity for sweeping institutional reforms. Journalist Safeta Biševac expects democratic improvements but little immediate change in foreign policy. Analyst Milivoje Mihajlović predicts a stronger European orientation and improved regional relations.
Political scientist Boris Varga warns that entrenched security structures and disagreements over Kosovo could undermine the transition, while Kosovo philosopher Shkëlzen Maliqi believes the movement’s ideological diversity could produce serious divisions.
Veteran Serbian politician Nenad Čanak offers perhaps the sharpest warning: voters have removed the previous political leadership without necessarily knowing what will replace it.
Together, their assessments expose the central uncertainty surrounding Serbia’s political transition: whether a movement united by opposition to Vučić can develop a coherent programme capable of transforming the country.
Čanak’s warning: Serbia voted for a ‘cat in a bag’
For Čanak, the election result reflects widespread exhaustion with the political system built under Vučić and his allies.
But he cautions that the victorious Student List remains politically difficult to define.
“This election result has shown that a large majority of people in Serbia are utterly exhausted by the clerical fascism that has taken hold of the country and are prepared to vote even for a ‘cat in a bag’ just to see Vučić and Dačić leave the political stage,” Čanak told BalkanView.
“They have lost, and now we will see the cat.”
Čanak’s reference to “clerical fascism” reflects his own characterisation of Serbia’s political environment, rather than an independently established description.
He invoked a saying associated with former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping to explain the uncertainty surrounding the new political movement.
“On the one hand, ‘It doesn’t matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice,’ as Deng Xiaoping said,” Čanak said.
“But only when the bag is opened — when the government is formed — will we see what colour the cat is, how many kittens it has and, most importantly, whether it is actually a cat at all, or something entirely different.”
His warning highlights the difference between electoral unity and governing coherence.
The Student List brought together voters and candidates from different ideological backgrounds, united primarily by opposition to the previous government.
That diversity helped produce an electoral majority, but could become a source of tension once the movement must make decisions about economic policy, foreign relations and Kosovo.
Čanak’s assessment is particularly relevant because the movement has yet to demonstrate how its competing political tendencies will function within a single government.
A political victory, but not yet a democratic transformation
Janjić believes Serbia’s transformation has already begun at the societal level.
“Even today, social life and people’s behavior in Serbia are different from what they were before the October 25 elections,” he told BalkanView.
He described a growing sense of liberation from what he called the previous government’s propaganda machinery, police pressure and threats against political opponents.
Janjić said citizens were increasingly demanding accountability for alleged abuses of power, corruption and links between state officials and organised crime.
But he warned that the incoming government would inherit weakened institutions and serious economic problems.
“We are talking about an economy and institutions that have entered a process of self-destruction,” he said.
According to Janjić, the first priorities should include assessing the country’s finances, ensuring monetary stability, reviewing government contracts and reforming intelligence and security institutions.
He singled out the Security Information Agency, known as BIA, and the National Security Council as institutions requiring comprehensive reform.
Biševac, an editor and columnist at the independent Serbian newspaper Danas, expressed similar concerns about the political system built during Vučić’s rule.
She accused the outgoing leadership of turning Serbia into an increasingly authoritarian state dominated by the ruling party and politically connected business interests.
Her expectations for the next government, however, are deliberately modest.
“I do not expect grand projects or miracles. I simply want a more orderly and civilized country whose government respects its own citizens,” she told BalkanView.
Biševac believes rebuilding the judiciary, restoring institutional independence, improving public services and tackling corruption will take precedence over major foreign policy initiatives.
The contrast between the two assessments is largely one of emphasis rather than direction.
Janjić sees the transition as an opportunity for sweeping institutional reconstruction, while Biševac stresses the difficulty of reversing years of concentrated political power.
Can the student movement dismantle the old system?
The scale of the challenge is also central to Varga’s analysis.
In an opinion article republished by BalkanView, Varga described the election as a non-violent electoral revolution comparable in political significance to the defeat of Slobodan Milošević in October 2000.
But he warned that electoral defeat does not automatically dismantle a political system.
The Serbian Progressive Party’s influence extends into public administration, security institutions, state enterprises and parts of the media, he argued.
Varga said the new authorities would need to prioritise reforms of intelligence agencies, public broadcasters, the judiciary and prosecutorial institutions.
He also warned that the outgoing political establishment could retain considerable influence through officials and employees appointed during its years in power.
Unlike conventional political parties, the Student List emerged as a decentralised movement without a single dominant leader or established hierarchy.
Its candidates include academics, legal professionals, economists, healthcare specialists and figures from the cultural sector.
That diversity helped unite voters opposed to Vučić, but it could complicate governing.
Maliqi, a Kosovo-based philosopher and political analyst, made a similar observation.
He compared the Student List’s broad coalition-building strategy with the political alliances that challenged Milošević in the 1990s.
The movement brought together people from different ideological backgrounds around the common objective of removing the incumbent leadership.
That unity may prove harder to maintain once decisions must be made about foreign policy, institutional reform and Kosovo.
“It is still unknown who will become prime minister and who will serve as ministers, so I cannot make clear predictions,” Maliqi wrote in an exclusive commentary for BalkanView.
He warned that the new government would also face resistance from established officials and political networks embedded in state institutions.
Čanak’s metaphor reinforces this concern from another perspective.
Where Varga and Maliqi identify institutional and ideological risks, Čanak questions whether the movement’s political character can be properly understood before it begins governing.
Europe first — but how far from Russia?
The experts broadly expect Serbia’s relations with the European Union to improve, although they disagree about how far the new government will move away from its traditional balancing policy between Western powers, Russia and China.
Mihajlović, a Serbian journalist and political analyst, believes the incoming government will pursue a more substantive European orientation.
“Serbia cannot orient itself toward China, Russia or the United States as its primary strategic direction. Above all, it will turn toward Europe, where it naturally belongs,” he told BalkanView.
He argued that Serbia already has many European legal standards incorporated into its legislation and that the main challenge is implementing them.
Janjić also expects a change in foreign policy priorities.
He described the Student List’s proposed approach as a “multi-vector foreign policy”, with Europe taking precedence, followed by the United States, Russia, China and other international partners.
Under that approach, Serbia would maintain relations with existing partners but reorder its strategic priorities.
Biševac is more cautious.
Although she hopes for a stronger pro-Western policy, she believes Serbia’s economic and energy dependencies will limit the pace of change.
“Serbia will not impose sanctions on Russia because we are simply dependent on Russian gas,” she said, also citing uncertainty surrounding the Serbian oil company NIS.
Varga likewise highlighted statements by prominent figures associated with the Student List indicating that sanctions against Moscow were unlikely.
The movement’s positions on Russia and EU integration therefore remain an important test of whether its commitment to democratic reform will translate into broader geopolitical realignment.
The distinction matters for Brussels, which has repeatedly sought greater alignment between Serbia’s foreign policy and that of the European Union.
For now, the experts’ assessments suggest that democratic reform at home may advance faster than changes in Serbia’s international partnerships.
Čanak’s warning also applies to this uncertainty: until the new government presents and implements a coherent foreign policy, its electoral victory alone cannot establish the country’s future strategic direction.
The Kosovo dilemma: The biggest test of change
No issue exposes the movement’s internal contradictions more clearly than Kosovo.
The analysts expect the new leadership to confront the unresolved dispute, but they differ over whether a meaningful change in policy is possible.
Biševac expects Serbia’s constitutional position to remain unchanged.
“The Student List adheres to Serbia’s Constitution, which considers Kosovo part of Serbia, and there will almost certainly be no change in that regard,” she said.
She nevertheless believes the new authorities are unlikely to encourage violence or instability in Kosovo.
Biševac also expects greater scrutiny of financial assistance sent from Belgrade to Kosovo Serbs, including allegations that politically connected individuals may have misused funds intended for local communities.
Mihajlović is more optimistic about the practical consequences of the transition.
He believes the new government will abandon policies that, in his assessment, encouraged division and enabled criminal networks to exert influence over Kosovo’s Serbian population.
“Kosovo Serbs have been victims of Vučić’s policies. They were the price paid for the survival of his government,” he said.
Mihajlović expects a more transparent approach and less cooperation with politically connected criminal structures.
Janjić takes a different view of the immediate timetable.
He does not expect restarting the stalled EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina to be among the new government’s first priorities.
Instead, he believes the authorities will initially review commitments undertaken by previous Serbian governments and inform the public about them.
He expects future negotiations to address the rights and self-governance of Kosovo Serbs, implementation of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, property disputes, pensions, healthcare and social protection.
“Overall, this dialogue will no longer be limited solely to the question of Kosovo’s status,” Janjić said.
For Maliqi, however, the constitutional issue remains the central obstacle.
He warned that the Student List’s commitment not to amend Serbia’s constitutional position on Kosovo could clash with obligations arising from the Brussels and Ohrid normalisation agreements.
He also argued that Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s approach to implementing the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities could contribute to renewed deadlock.
Maliqi believes the incoming Serbian government will face pressure to reconcile its domestic political commitments with expectations from the European Union.
Varga identifies Kosovo as a potential source of internal division within the Student List itself.
He warned that nationalist positions expressed by some movement supporters and candidates could conflict with the democratic expectations generated by the election victory.
Čanak did not specifically address Kosovo in his statement to BalkanView. His broader warning, however, concerns precisely the uncertainty over the ideological character and governing priorities of the incoming leadership.
Taken together, the assessments suggest that the new government may change Belgrade’s methods, rhetoric and political relationships in Kosovo without changing its fundamental position on sovereignty.
That distinction could determine whether the transition produces a genuine diplomatic breakthrough or simply a different form of the existing stalemate.
A new beginning for relations with North Macedonia?
Relations with neighbouring countries are another area where expectations are relatively positive.
Mihajlović believes Serbia will move away from confrontational rhetoric towards Croatia, Montenegro and other Western Balkan neighbours.
“As far as the region is concerned, I believe the era of quarrels with neighboring countries is over,” he said.
He expects the new leadership to seek stronger institutional cooperation, although he also raised concerns about organised crime and illicit financial flows involving Serbia and North Macedonia.
Mihajlović argued that Skopje and Belgrade should prioritise cooperation against cross-border criminal networks.
His allegations about illicit money and criminal activity were presented as concerns requiring action, not as established findings against particular individuals or institutions.
Biševac also expects more constructive regional relations.
She said the Student List’s willingness to cooperate across ethnic and political divisions within Serbia could translate into a less confrontational approach towards neighbouring states.
She anticipates continuity in traditionally friendly relations between Serbia and North Macedonia.
Janjić believes regional cooperation will become less dependent on personal relationships between political leaders.
He expects a greater focus on economic ties, institutional partnerships and direct contacts between citizens.
Maliqi is more reserved about the scale of potential change.
He expects Serbia to seek improved relations with Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but anticipates a more cautious approach towards North Macedonia.
He also questions whether relations between Belgrade and Tirana will remain as close as they were during the period when Vučić and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama promoted the Open Balkan initiative.
The differences illustrate that improved diplomatic rhetoric does not necessarily guarantee identical policies towards every neighbouring country.
The risk of another disappointed generation
Beyond foreign policy, the incoming government faces a challenge common to political movements that emerge from mass protests: translating public enthusiasm into effective governance.
The Student List’s electoral victory was driven by broad dissatisfaction with corruption, political control over institutions and the perceived absence of accountability.
But governing will require decisions about public spending, employment, state-owned enterprises, judicial appointments and relations with powerful domestic and international actors.
Janjić warned that restructuring institutions and addressing economic problems could generate significant political and social risks.
Biševac emphasised that restoring the rule of law and rebuilding public services would take time.
Varga cautioned that the outgoing ruling party could retain influence despite losing its parliamentary majority.
Maliqi warned that ideological differences within the victorious movement could emerge once the common objective of defeating Vučić had been achieved.
Mihajlović, by contrast, expressed confidence that the movement’s determination and anti-corruption agenda could overcome its lack of political experience.
Čanak offered the most pointed expression of the uncertainty: voters know which politicians they rejected, but not yet the political character of those they elected.
The divergence reflects a broader uncertainty about whether Serbia’s transition will produce durable democratic institutions or become vulnerable to political fragmentation.
What Serbia’s transition means for the Western Balkans
Serbia’s political future matters beyond its borders.
As the region’s largest economy and a central actor in several unresolved political disputes, its domestic direction can influence regional cooperation, European integration and security.
A more democratic Serbia could contribute to improved relations with its neighbours and create a more constructive environment for EU enlargement.
But the analysts’ views suggest that domestic democratisation and regional reconciliation should not be treated as automatic consequences of one another.
The new government could strengthen judicial independence, fight corruption and improve media freedom while maintaining longstanding positions on Kosovo and Russia.
It could also adopt a more cooperative diplomatic tone without immediately resolving disputes inherited from previous governments.
For North Macedonia, the opportunity lies primarily in stronger institutional and economic cooperation.
For Kosovo, the stakes are considerably higher because Belgrade’s constitutional position remains directly connected to the normalisation process.
For the European Union, the question is whether Serbia’s political transition will produce a more credible reform partner capable of implementing commitments rather than merely announcing them.
The election ended one era. The next has yet to be defined.
The six observers differ in their expectations, but their assessments converge on one conclusion: Serbia’s election victory is the beginning of a transition, not its completion.
Janjić expects a profound restructuring of state institutions and a more transparent approach to Kosovo.
Biševac anticipates democratic improvement but limited changes in foreign policy.
Mihajlović predicts a stronger European orientation and an end to confrontational regional politics.
Varga warns that the old political system may survive through entrenched networks and that Kosovo could divide the new leadership.
Maliqi sees an opportunity for change but questions whether a broad coalition united against Vučić can develop a coherent governing strategy.
Čanak questions the very nature of the political alternative that voters have brought to power.
His metaphor captures the dilemma running through all six assessments: Serbia’s voters have opened the door to political change, but the character of the new government will only become clear when it begins making difficult decisions.
The Student List has defeated a political establishment that dominated the country for 14 years. It now faces the more demanding task of proving that electoral change can produce accountable government, functioning institutions and more stable relations with the region.
Serbia has changed its political leadership. Whether it can change the system — and its place in the Western Balkans — remains the defining question.