By Veton Surroi
The Prime Minister of Albania, Edi Rama, last week offered a recommendation for Kosovo in the process of normalization with Serbia:
“In my view, Kosovo should completely forget Serbia, meaning it should unilaterally fulfill all the requirements of the dialogue and leave the ball in Serbia’s court, telling Europe—telling all European countries, even those that still don’t recognize it—‘Here we are. We fulfilled and signed everything; now go get Serbia’s signature.’ But Kosovo must totally detach itself from Serbia and not live with the idea of Serbia.”
A similar form of this recommendation has been made by Prime Minister Rama before, and the passage of time has not made the idea any more mature. The recommendation is wrong on at least three levels, the first and most essential being that Kosovo has no problems with any other neighbor except Serbia, and therefore it cannot forget or ignore Serbia.
Independent Kosovo is already separated from Serbia and does not “live with the idea of Serbia.” But independent states live in interdependence: when relations are bad, this is reflected in security, development, international standing, etc. The normalization process is meant to place a positive prefix before this interdependence—one in which Serbia’s actions will not harm Kosovo in matters of security, development, international position, and so on. (And naturally, vice versa—Serbia should see Kosovo as a friendly neighboring state, not a threat to its national interests.)
The second weakness in Prime Minister Rama’s idea concerns the negotiating format of the normalization process. Kosovo has already passed through negotiations in Rambouillet (1999) and Vienna (2007), where Serbia rejected agreements, yet Kosovo implemented them unilaterally. Such an approach brought Kosovo liberation (NATO intervention) and independence (via the Ahtisaari Package). While Kosovo achieved liberation and independence without Serbia’s consent, it cannot make Serbia a good neighbor if Serbia does not want that.
To reach the lowest common denominator of inter-state neighborly relations, the European Union offered the Brussels–Ohrid Agreement, modeled after the Basic Treaty between the two German states. This agreement, considered by Brussels as concluded between the two countries, is founded on equality between the parties—sovereign states that do not deny each other’s subjectivity, even without mutual recognition as two states. This agreement cannot be implemented unilaterally for the simple reason that Kosovo, like any other state, has no need to normalize inter-state relations with itself—and because the very purpose of the agreement is that Kosovo and Serbia be good neighbors, contributing jointly according to mutually agreed principles.
The third weakness concerns a misunderstanding of the trajectory of the normalization process. Kosovo has publicly accepted, through Prime Minister Kurti, the Brussels–Ohrid Agreement and has offered to sign it. Serbia has expressed public reservations, through President Vučić, toward the Agreement in Brussels and Ohrid, and later reiterated these reservations in writing through a letter by then-Prime Minister Brnabić. This letter—submitted under the rules of the Vienna Convention—constituted Serbia’s objection to the foundation of the Agreement, namely, the equality of the two sovereign states. Since the letter has not been withdrawn under Convention rules, Serbia still has not accepted the Brussels–Ohrid Agreement.
This diplomatic refusal has been accompanied by actions in other fields—from blocking Kosovo’s international identity to the paramilitary attack in Banjska, organized with the knowledge or participation of Serbia’s state organs. In this situation, Kosovo is, in fact, adhering to its obligations under the Brussels–Ohrid Agreement, while Serbia does not consider itself bound. It is precisely in this situation that Prime Minister Rama’s recommendation should apply: since “the ball is in Serbia’s court,” the European Union should pressure Serbia to implement the Agreement—for example, Kosovo could open its diplomatic mission in Belgrade and raise its flag there.
It is clear, however—judging from past EU actions—that such a thing will not happen. To recall: the EU has imposed punitive measures against Kosovo for “unilateral actions” (such as municipal mayors entering their offices), while not taking a single step to sanction the state whose self-declared leader of the Banjska paramilitary attack walks free.
Prime Minister Rama has been consistent in offering ideas and suggestions to Kosovo—and consistently, these ideas and suggestions have not served Kosovo’s interests. At one point, he offered a draft statute for the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities. This offer created the impression that there was a shortcut to normalization, and that some Albanians—not living in Kosovo—favored it. It also created a false impression that the laws and procedures in Kosovo (regarding local self-government) that guarantee inter-municipal cooperation are unnecessary—because everything can simply be accomplished through the will of a leader producing brilliant solutions.
In another instance, he proposed that the northern part of Kosovo be placed under NATO administration—meaning two forms of authority within Kosovo, one of which would suspend the civilian authority of the Republic of Kosovo. Such a solution would approximate Serbia’s objective since 1999: the creation of a separate authority in Serb-majority areas with a chain of command leading to Belgrade rather than institutional dependence on Kosovo.
In the interview where he again presented an idea for Kosovo last week, Prime Minister Rama explained that despite opposition to his actions toward Kosovo,
“I do not retract a single comma of what I’ve said, nor do I regret anything I’ve done, because I did everything out of Albania’s interest.”
Whether Prime Minister Rama’s actions toward Kosovo have been in Albania’s interest is open to debate (how can actions against Kosovo’s interests be in Albania’s interest?). What should not be up for debate is that the prime minister of a neighboring country ought to consult Kosovo’s authorities in advance when offering ideas, suggestions, or public statements about Kosovo; this is a basic rule of good neighborly relations. Perhaps this would be a good new beginning for redefining Albania’s interests.
/Koha