By Preç Zogaj
Yesterday, after more than two months of silence, two resonant pieces of news came out of the U.S. State Department that echoed across Albania.
One was the appointment of former Ambassador Yuri Kim to a new post. This, in itself, holds little relevance to developments within our country. It only grabs attention due to the relentless “news cycle” from the Berisha front—rumors that she had been ceremoniously removed and was under investigation. Berisha’s envoys were so confident of her ousting that two or three of them would even confront me on TV panels, as if I had personally appointed her ambassador to Tirana:
“Where’s your Kim now? Heard she’s done for?”
Of course, they addressed me this way simply because I had supported the stances of U.S. diplomats in Tirana as reflective of White House and State Department policy—not because I had gained anything personally from them.
The second piece of news was far more significant: the State Department’s 2024 report praising the work of SPAK, Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption Structure. This endorsement is especially important in light of the relative silence from the new Trump administration—a silence understandable given their major starting priorities, but which had fed speculation in Tirana that Washington might soon “pull the plug” on SPAK. And if that happened, the two leading actors of the entrenched political caste would have free rein: Rama to neuter it, Berisha to dismantle it.
The immediate goal of such claims was to discredit ongoing investigations and discourage future ones, drawing absurd analogies with Trump’s own legal battles in the U.S.
Anyone with a minimal dose of professionalism had already warned that, come March or April, a first supportive and encouraging message from the new American administration would likely arrive. And here we are.
In the report published yesterday, from all the high-profile individuals under investigation in Albania today, only one is mentioned by name: Sali Berisha. The report cites the specific legal and administrative acts underpinning his designation.
The timing is telling. The report came out after the appointment of new leadership in the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, which oversees the Balkans and Albania.
What’s more, the report doesn’t just commend SPAK’s work—it also notes, with a critical but motivating tone, that “prosecutions remain at low levels.” Honest and courageous SPAK prosecutors—as well as GJKKO judges—should feel bolstered in their efforts. The broader public, too, has reason to maintain its trust and support for the new justice system.
What happened is what was expected. The complete opposite of the “news” peddled by Berisha’s prophets, who insisted that his designation had already been lifted, speaking to others as if this were a done deal. When, in fact, it hadn’t happened—and still hasn’t.
“Missionaries of the duck,” Spartak Ngjela once called the types who would bring Berisha inflated or false reports—knowing how desperately he craved them—in order to gain his attention, praise, candidacy, or appointment. “Bring the duck, get the reward,” Ngjela would laugh.
This tradition continues. Berisha and his loyalists have turned “Time proved us right” into a hit chorus. Makare, as they say in Shkodër. Many Democrats and non-Berisha opposition supporters would very much like that to be true. Primarily out of a concrete interest: the rotation of power after twelve years.
But things must be called what they are. So far, time has proven them right about nothing—not about how Berisha has framed his designation, nor about the consequences of his takeover of the Democratic Party.
It’s not even worth delving into the many single-use narratives he has consumed to maintain and expand his base. In that regard, let’s give credit where it’s due: he has operated skillfully, as a man well-versed in the mindset and worldview of his followers, attuned to the light and shadow of human nature—focusing above all on the shadows.
What remains clear is this: his designation had nothing to do with “preventing the division of Kosovo,” as he has trumpeted. The puzzle pieces don’t fit. The Biden administration was categorically against any Kosovo-Serbia peace deal involving land swaps.
His designation has nothing to do with the “McGonigal affair” either—a crooked former FBI agent from New York, investigated and jailed by the American justice system for serious misconduct and corruption. Among other things, he was convicted of accepting a $225,000 bribe from an Albanian associate in a scheme involving Edi Rama, aimed against the former Democratic Party leader, Lulzim Basha. Again, the puzzle pieces don’t fit. The timelines don’t match. A story without accurate dates is just a fairy tale. Unless, of course, Berisha becomes Basha.
Can one seriously imagine that a former FBI employee, already under investigation and dismissed well before Berisha’s designation, could set in motion the entire interagency sanction mechanism of the world’s most powerful country? Only narrow minds who think of the U.S. as a gossip chamber at the level of a party section in a Tirana neighborhood could believe that.
Time has not yet vindicated the core refrain: that the new administration would lift Berisha’s “non grata” status. On the contrary—the State Department’s citation of his designation and investigation in yesterday’s report is a bad sign for those awaiting a reversal.
In the end, there’s still the promise of election victory—Berisha’s most alluring and mobilizing message for his followers. But the latest polling from two reputable firms—“Piopoli” in Italy and “Eurobarometer”—shows that the “Great Albania” coalition is polling even lower than the combined PD and LSI in 2021.
If that holds, it means the Reestablished Opposition will have wasted four years during Edi Rama’s most corruption-tainted term, while in 2021 the opposition was only 37,000 votes behind the Socialist Party. A great tragedy—but let’s await the election verdict.
