By Ben Andoni
At the Tirana Summit, Kosovo—represented by President Vjosa Osmani—received the most direct messages yet regarding the need to resume dialogue with Serbia. At the same event, Serbia, operating on a different frequency regarding EU integration, openly challenged the EU and effortlessly sidestepped expectations—right there in Tirana.
Ironically, Kosovo, burdened by the cynical sovereigntism of acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti, still carries €150 million in EU-imposed sanctions. Meanwhile, Serbia not only snubs but brazenly defies the EU: from refusing to hand over the criminal Radoičić to President Vučić’s recent participation in Moscow’s Victory Day Parade—honoring the end of fascism—one begins to grasp the depths of the dysfunction plaguing the dialogue.
“We must first talk about lifting EU measures, as they damage the EU’s credibility,” pleaded Osmani at the one-day European Political Community Summit—an event where Kosovo barely registered on the agenda.
What remains for Kosovo? Nothing but patience, and above all, the urgent need for its political class to form a new parliament and adopt a far more pragmatic approach. This realization seems to have dawned on the PDK and LDK, who campaigned on improving relations with Western partners and addressing their deep concerns about Kosovo’s growing isolation at a dangerous geopolitical moment. If Mr. Kurti succeeds in forming a government, he must abandon nationalist pathos and meaningfully reengage Brussels and Washington, whose support for Kosovo now seems increasingly remote.
“The roadmap is very clear. We’ve spent too much time on the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. The EU is right to demand concrete progress on political issues, local elections, and security matters. Urgency is not a loss of credibility. We need to break the deadlock. I hope we can resume dialogue with Pristina and Belgrade in the coming weeks,” President Macron stated in Tirana, indirectly addressing President Osmani’s concerns—but also confirming what we already know: far too much time has been wasted.
Macron’s carefully crafted statement, though diplomatic, betrays a sobering truth: Kosovo is no longer a top priority, and the time and energy once dedicated to it will no longer be the same. Ukraine’s crisis, rising nationalism, internal EU divisions, and shifting alliances in the wake of Donald Trump’s return to the spotlight have all shaken Brussels’ focus—even though Kosovo remains nominally on the European agenda. The European Parliament recognizes Kosovo’s path toward EU membership as a potential candidate and lists it among the next wave of enlargement. The EU actively supports Kosovo’s European perspective and offers guidance and assistance, including through the European Reform Agenda. Officially, the EU remains involved in facilitating the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, a key condition for Kosovo’s integration. Yet, while Kosovo demonstrates its commitment through democratic elections and alignment with EU standards, Serbia continues to flout them—holding elections widely unrecognized by EU states and plagued by domestic unrest.
And yet, just days ago—and for the second year in a row—Kosovo failed to overcome procedural hurdles for its membership bid in the Council of Europe. Even worse, Kosovo’s request wasn’t even on the ministerial meeting agenda—a development Belgrade officially applauded (!), citing that only states can join the Council, and Kosovo lacks such recognition at the UN level. It’s worth recalling that Serbia is bound not to obstruct Kosovo’s path to international integration.
Serbia’s defense—even after the International Court of Justice ruled in favor of Kosovo’s independence—rests on a seemingly simple argument: if Kosovo is recognized as a sovereign state, then every ethnic minority around the world should be granted the same right to statehood. This is why Kosovo’s leaders acted wisely by turning to the International Court of Justice, the UN’s highest judicial body. On July 22, 2010, it issued an advisory opinion affirming that Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence did not violate international law. As Court President Hisashi Owada declared: “The declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 2008 did not violate international law.”
Kosovo declared its independence in 2008 in full compliance with international law, following the same path taken by every state that has proclaimed independence as a reflection of its people’s will. That decision was shaped by the grim backdrop of 10,000 civilians killed and 800,000 forcibly displaced in 1999—horrors that prompted a swift and largely uncontested international response.
Yet here we are in 2025: Kosovo still carries the weight of sanctions, the burden of Serbia’s belief that it will never be a state, and a dialogue process with no clear direction. The EU’s promise of membership no longer holds allure, particularly since several member states don’t recognize Kosovo. Meanwhile, the EU’s “status-neutral” approach toward Kosovo continues to hinder its prospects while enabling Serbia to maintain the status quo with impunity. In some cases, Kosovo is still depicted as part of Serbia on official maps.
In the coming days, the new EU foreign affairs chief—former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas—will visit Pristina, and the new EU Special Representative for the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue, Danish diplomat and regional expert Peter Sørensen, will begin shuttling between Belgrade and Pristina. But the fundamental problem persists: as things stand, there is no real momentum to restart the dialogue. The “ace up the sleeve”? Kallas suggests there’s something in the works for both parties. So far, however, this seems less like a solution and more like prolonging Pristina’s agony and pushing the dialogue into oblivion for Belgrade.
Which means we may be moving toward a stick-only approach—but that would require a united, not fragmented, Europe. In the end, the so-called trump card feels more like a magician’s trick than a pragmatic instrument for breaking Serbia’s grip on the status quo with Pristina—especially with Brussels as unfocused as it currently is.
(Homo Albanicus)