By Ben Andoni
Snap elections, investigations into the 2025 elections, criminal gangs involved in the electoral process, misuse of the administration, hunger strikes—these are just some of the accusations and predictions thrown around by the DP leadership after May 11. But in the mouth of Mr. Berisha, they take on the weight of authority from what was once the largest opposition party. Unfortunately, that party has shrunk even further since the 2021 election results.
In the remaining time until September, the Central Election Commission and all institutions tied to the electoral process will have to deal with a flood of complaints that only keep growing from the Blue Headquarters. The problem becomes “more complicated” when you consider that most likely, the DP will sit in the new legislature, where the ambition—at best—is to only vote on the Integration Laws, a path carved out for Albania by a convenient European conjuncture and the government’s smooth synchronization with Brussels’ politics.
Will the DP manage to bring the issue of the elections—according to its claims—onto the European agenda? Or will it use this as a tactic to delay genuine self-analysis and simply reshuffle its leadership structure?
Unfortunately, the most promising opposition MPs were those who came from the Open Lists. Alimehmeti, Tabaku, Murrizi, Dogjani in Tirana, and many others in the districts, showed far greater potential than those placed on the Closed Lists. And it wasn’t just their political contribution—it was also the energy they brought, which ultimately turned against them like a boomerang.
Ironically, many of them faced political blows even after their greatest accomplishment: winning the primaries, one of the DP’s most democratic mechanisms. But these primaries now seem more like cosmetic window dressing than a true display of democratic principles.
Among these cases, MP Sula stands out as a glaring example—not just within the DP ranks.
Still, many voices from within the Blue Camp are now demanding analysis before more accusations are launched. Berisha’s resignation, as a matter of principle and institutional responsibility, has been ruled out by the man himself—as well as by many of those comfortably placed on the safe lists.
As for a serious analysis? It’s not even being seriously discussed—or if it happens at all, it’ll likely be just for show, to tick the box.
This is exactly what happened four years ago in 2021, when the DP gathered 59 candidates with the promise of a thorough analysis. Many within the party may say that analysis took place, but in truth, it never happened—not in any meaningful way that produced clear conclusions.
Conclusions that could’ve enabled a serious fight for a new Electoral Code, granting the opposition more control; or that could’ve guided stronger mobilization in areas where the DP continues to lose ground and no longer wins votes.
But that analysis never happened in 2021. And now, it seems unlikely to happen in 2025 either—leaving the DP as nothing more than a shrinking political formation, withering under the rule of a majority increasingly cynical and ruthless toward democratic development in the country.
Even though there are signs of renewal, and this legislature will include a completely new group within the Socialist Party, that alone says very little about democratic quality.