As a scorching summer grips Serbia, tensions are rising not only due to the heatwave, but also in response to a wave of student-led and citizen protests spreading across the country. At the heart of the unrest is the student movement’s “fifth demand”: the call for snap parliamentary elections.
For the first time since taking power in 2012, President Aleksandar Vučić and his political allies appear reluctant to call early elections—a tactic they have frequently employed in the past to consolidate power, often organizing votes well before the end of a parliamentary term. According to Prof. Dr. Ivan Videnović, a university professor and former Serbian state secretary, this hesitation reflects a recognition that public sentiment has shifted significantly. He suggests that internal polling may indicate the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) can no longer secure a stable majority—even with the possibility of electoral irregularities.
“Increasing repression has become the regime’s primary strategy,” Videnović told BalkanView, warning that the government’s gradual crackdown echoes authoritarian approaches seen in Russia and Belarus. However, he argued that Serbian citizens are unlikely to accept the same degree of state control. “Unlike Russians or Belarusians, Serbians do not submit easily to systemic terror,” he said.
The government’s tactics now involve short-term detentions and legal harassment of protesters in what Videnović describes as a campaign to normalize repression and dull the edge of civic resistance. At the same time, Vučić’s personal drive for domination and humiliation of opponents fuels his narrative of “victory over colored revolutions”—a phrase he frequently invokes to justify crackdowns, but which ironically continues to galvanize protests, Videnović argues. “He’s at war with his own citizens. He is president only to his loyalists and oligarchs.”
Recent provocations, including orchestrated nationalist tensions in Novi Pazar—a city that became a symbol of student solidarity across ethnic lines—mark what Videnović calls a “new low.” Vučić’s attempts to manufacture ethnic strife between Bosniaks and Serbs in the city follow similar efforts in Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. However, he believes the students will reject these tactics: “I hope they’ve seen through this pathetic, radical stunt.”
Videnović argues that Vučić’s political era is waning. For months, the president has failed to find signs of recovery for his party in opinion polls, particularly at the local level where his loyalists face mounting public anger. The president’s ambition to be remembered as Serbia’s greatest builder is also under threat. Following a deadly construction accident in Novi Sad, engineers and regulators have grown cautious, slowing major infrastructure projects. Vučić has responded by personally intervening in construction timelines, taking on liability for projects—a move Videnović sees as further evidence of deepening instability.
Amid the turmoil, the future of Serbia’s political trajectory remains unclear. The student movement is preparing its own candidate list for future elections, but, according to Videnović, there are growing concerns over foreign and ideological influences. “Russia appears to be actively promoting candidates, leveraging Serbia’s open intelligence and propaganda space,” he said. This influence, he adds, is shaping the student list’s platform into one that is increasingly nationalistic, Eurosceptic, and aligned with anti-mining hysteria—a stance at odds with Serbia’s rich natural resource base. Existing parliamentary opposition parties are already signaling reluctance to unify with a list driven by such radical elements.
Videnović concludes that Serbia remains trapped in a political deadlock. “On one side is a citizenry exhausted by cronyism and Vučić’s personalized rule. On the other, a student movement that, while legitimate and widely supported, remains vulnerable to malign foreign influence and ideological extremism—both from the far right and the far left.”
As a result, Serbia’s key questions—whether to pursue European or Eastern alliances, how to approach relations with neighbors, what role the “Serbian world” should play, and the country’s stance on Kosovo—are likely to remain unresolved for the foreseeable future.