By Xhelal Neziri

The economic presence of the Russian Federation in the Western Balkans has declined since the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. However, this decline does not mean that Russian influence in the region has disappeared. Despite declining Russian investment, Moscow’s political influence has grown surprisingly. This disparity between capital and influence is a reality that has surprised a significant proportion of Western states. There are still disputes, hostilities, tensions, inter-ethnic conflicts and blockages in the Euro-Atlantic integration process, making this region vulnerable to malign influences, mainly coming from Russia. If not with money, what does Russia use to entice the Balkan countries that continue to keep its agenda alive and even strengthen it in the region?

Shrinking economic presence

The sanctions and restrictive measures imposed by the US, the EU and the West in general seem to have exhausted the economy of the Russian Federation, which has led to a drastic reduction of its economic presence in the region. For example, in North Macedonia there has been a decline in Russian Federation investment of almost 6.5 million dollars in the last two years. The total amount of direct investments dropped from 28.9 to 22.4 million dollars, which put Russia in 13th place in the list of countries with the largest investments in North Macedonia. According to official data, the trade volume with the Russian Federation amounted to just over 310 million dollars last year, which is about 37 million dollars less than in 2022. The year 2024 seems to be even weaker. Within the first quarter, trade turnover amounted to just under 80 million US dollars, the lowest figure in the last decade of economic cooperation between North Macedonia and the Russian Federation.

Direct Russian investment in the Western Balkans is estimated at 2.8 billion euros, of which 1.2 billion is in Montenegro, 1.1 billion in Serbia and 540 million in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kosovo and Albania, there are almost no Russian investments at all, except for those from third countries or “offshore” countries, where guaranteed discretion and low taxes usually attract dirty capital on a global scale. As in North Macedonia, Russian investment is also shrinking in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia’s fatigue with the war in Ukraine and the allocation of almost half of its budget to the army and war have increased the budget deficit of this federation to almost 13 billion euros, an almost prohibitive amount for a state under sanctions from the entire Western world. From 2022, the Russian Federation recorded more expenditure than revenue, weakening its economy. Focusing the majority of its budget on defense or the war in Ukraine has forced Moscow to withdraw its capital invested in other countries, which served as an instrument of influence. Since 2014, after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Russian capital has been withdrawing from the Balkans, with this process accelerating especially after the start of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. From that moment on, all the Balkan countries are aligned behind the EU’s foreign policy, with the exception of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are not prepared to apply all the sanctions imposed on Moscow.

Increasing political presence

Despite the shrinking economic presence in the region, which is due to sanctions and budgets that are primarily financing the war in Ukraine, Russia has nevertheless managed not only to maintain its political influence, but also to expand it. Indicators of the increase in political influence are the growth of pro-Russian parties, particularly in the Balkan countries with a Slavic Orthodox majority. Kostandin Kostandinov’s Vazrazhdane (Rebirth) is a Bulgarian pro-Russian party that was founded in 2014. In 2022, there were only 10 MPs in the Bulgarian parliament, while there are currently 37 MPs. Together with the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which does not hide its sympathy for Russia, they make up 57 of a total of 240 MPs. The LEVICA (Left) party in North Macedonia, also a pro-Russian entity, won only two MPs in the 2020 elections, while it won up to six MPs in the June 2024 elections. Together with the ZNAM party and the Serbian Democratic Party, which openly cultivate contacts with Moscow’s diplomats, they make up 13 of a total of 120 MPs in the North Macedonian parliament. Serbia’s new government has increased the number of officials who publicly advocate maintaining close relations with Russia, despite the threat of integration with the EU, on which the Union is economically almost dependent due to direct investments and exports of goods to the large European market. The strengthening of pro-Russian political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the leadership of Milorad Dodik has increased the degree of non-functionality of the Federation and strengthened its status quo, which is the main goal of penetrating Moscow.

The logical question here is: How is it possible for Russia to increase its political influence while decreasing its economic presence? The use of emotions by promoting closeness to the Russian people for cultural and religious reasons on the one hand and fear and hatred of the West on the other is proving to be a very effective tool for Russia. To implement this strategy, Russia uses Orthodox churches in the region, Russian cultural associations opened in almost all cities, foundations (“Ruski Mir”, “Rossotrudnichestvo”, “The Gorchakov Fund”) and online media. Church and cultural diplomacy is becoming increasingly active, while propaganda and misinformation is spread via proxy media operating in the region’s languages. The slow and difficult integration of the countries of the region into the EU is being abused by these structures to further increase support for the “alternatives” offered by Moscow, such as BRICS.

This situation undoubtedly requires a rethinking of the approach to countering Russian influence in the region as long as it is seen as malign. Accelerating European integrations would be a more appropriate response to this risk. Investing in infrastructural, economic and cultural links between the countries of the region would then help to reduce tensions between the peoples. The next step would be to intensify cooperation with the EU before full integration, a cooperation that means not only economy and security, but also culture, education and science. Without a serious response to this threat, the pro-Russian political forces in the region will gain more and more ground. Their further involvement in Bulgaria, Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina will lead to even greater conflict, which could ultimately destroy the region’s European dream.

Source: The Geopost