This time, Albin Kurti won without promising national unification, without a strong Vetëvendosje Movement (since everything revolved around his figure), and while bearing the cost of four years in power during which he fulfilled almost none of his promises. Yet, he managed to impose himself through a discourse of idealism and political justice, overshadowing the more rational and pragmatic campaigns of the LDK and PDK.
By Lorik Idrizi
If we analyze the results of the February 9 elections and the history of elections in Kosovo, we can conclude that we are entering a political era of Albin Kurti, much like the eras of Rugova and Thaçi before him. The ballots reflect that, unofficially, around 41% of Kosovo’s citizens voted for Kurti—this time not to punish others, but to choose him, even if not granting him the full 51% majority. This marks a fundamental shift from the 2021 elections, when the public vote was primarily a sanction against the political establishment, pushing it to the brink of collapse.
The Vetëvendosje Movement no longer had the political momentum of 2021, nor did it enjoy the synergy with Vjosa Osmani. In fact, there was no significant progress in economic or social aspects, and yet it still managed to secure 41% of the vote. The decline was far smaller than expected.
This time, Albin Kurti won without promising national unification, without a strong Vetëvendosje Movement (as everything was peripheral compared to his figure), and despite the cost of four years in power, during which he failed to deliver on most of his promises. However, he managed to impose himself through a discourse of idealism and political justice, overshadowing the more rational and pragmatic campaigns of the LDK and PDK.
If analyzed through the lens of Michel Foucault, who sees discourse as a mechanism through which power is manifested and maintained in society, we can argue that Kurti’s success does not rest solely on a political program but on his ability to construct a narrative that shapes knowledge, identity, and power relations.
Kosovo’s citizens seem to have found in Kurti the embodiment of knowledge and idealism—so much so that nothing rational in his opponents’ campaigns made an impression. His discourse of incorruptibility and relentless pursuit of justice has triumphed over offers for sustainable economic development.
An analogy with Ibrahim Rugova may help explain this phenomenon: Kosovo’s voting sociology suggests that citizens often believe in political eras. During Rugova’s time, many policies of the moment were not decisive because he embodied the ideal of freedom. It seems that even today, Kosovo’s citizens are willing to overlook Kurti’s political missteps, seeing him as the figure of political idealism that the country needs in this context. With Rugova, this strategy proved successful—whether history will repeat itself remains to be seen.