By Ditmir Bushati
As I was reading the annual reports of the European Commission for the countries aspiring to join the EU, along with the enlargement communication, I was reminded of the renowned storyteller and tireless literary craftsman Gabriel García Márquez, who once said in an interview: “In the end, literature is nothing but carpentry. Writing something is almost as hard as making a table. In both cases, you are working with reality, a material as hard as wood. Both are full of tricks and techniques. Ultimately, there is very little magic and a lot of hard, relentless work.”
Although the European Commission’s reports are far from being literature or carpentry, the same logic applies to them. Their content seeks to strike a fair balance between reflecting the reality in countries aspiring to membership and encouraging them to continue reforms. At the same time, it is crucial for the European Commission to maintain credibility with both European taxpayers and the citizens of aspiring countries—especially when it is well-known that for more than two decades, enlargement policy, despite being widely acknowledged as one of the EU’s most successful policies, has produced few tangible results for the Western Balkans.
Given today’s security environment in Europe, shaped by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the European Commission has in the past two years attempted to present enlargement as a key geopolitical tool for the EU—primarily to convince EU member states that enlargement can help address some of Europe’s pressing challenges. Meanwhile, member states have given the Commission space to keep the hope of membership alive through symbolic acts reflected in recognizing the membership perspectives of Ukraine and Moldova, accelerating the opening of negotiation chapters with Albania, and closing several chapters with Montenegro.
In her State of the Union speech this September, the President of the European Commission spoke of the “future reunification of Europe” and described an enlarged EU with the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova as “a security guarantee for all of us.”
Because of this shattering geopolitical environment, the EU is undergoing a transformation—from a community initially focused on trade and economics into a geo-strategic project. From a soft influencer in building democratic institutions into a wielder of hard power, placing emphasis on security, energy, sanctions, and even industrial policy and strategic autonomy.
It is true that this geopolitical context has opened a window of opportunity for EU enlargement. Yet the long-term outlook of this policy remains unclear. If we refer to the European Commission’s assessments in the enlargement package, membership of new countries within the mandate of this Commission appears extremely difficult. Regardless of the optimism of senior EU officials seeking to revive a process long dormant, the Commission will have two red lines that cannot be crossed regarding candidate countries’ progress towards EU membership: geopolitical alignment and sustainable rule-of-law reforms in the economy.
Substance, Not Form — for a New Path
In this year’s enlargement package, one notices an effort by the European Commission to distance itself from the bitter legacy of “turning a blind eye” to democratic backsliding in Serbia. Although overdue, this shift deserves recognition. However, according to the Commission’s own assessment, the fact that Kosovo—despite unfair restrictive measures by the EU and a membership application left waiting for years—still registered progress in many areas, calls into question the effectiveness of the EU’s current approach.
For a long time, I have argued that the EU must explore a new path in our region, that of democratic encirclement of Serbia with success stories. Montenegro and Albania can and should open this new path, as they do not face insurmountable challenges. Above all, their unresolved issues with neighbors in the EU are far less complicated than those of other regional states. Yet for this path to become an irreversible road toward EU membership, success stories must be real, and reforms must be sustainable. The Commission must shift from being merely a preacher to becoming a demanding and driving force for the implementation of democratic standards and European values in our region.
For example, the OSCE-ODIHR report on Albania’s 11 May 2025 parliamentary elections maps out the influence of crime, the misuse of state assets, the public administration, and the media. While a similarly critical OSCE-ODIHR report on Serbia’s 2023 elections hindered Serbia’s progress towards the EU, in Albania’s case, the European Commission must prioritize and decisively address political reform related to the functioning of all institutions to guarantee free and fair elections. Otherwise, the absence of true reform will become a barrier to meeting rule-of-law standards and ensuring the proper functioning of democratic institutions.
Similarly, the Commission’s positive evaluations of SPAK’s work in combating corruption and organized crime must be accompanied by concrete assessments of its impact on good governance, public integrity, and the standards required by the EU accession process. The punitive effect of specialized structures against impunity remains limited as long as preventive and corrective elements rely mainly on governance and the adoption of practices that ensure the integrity of public life and the proper administration of the state budget.
While justice is responsible for identifying the criminal liability of senior officials or criminal groups, governance and its institutions must serve as dams protecting us from the “floods” of corruption and crime.
If, in the fight against corruption and organized crime, we rely solely on SPAK, I fear that both we and the European Commission will repeat the same mistake made with the justice reform—where the focus fell more on the number of prosecutors and judges removed through vetting than on other elements equally essential for an effective justice system.
Alongside listing senior officials or criminal groups facing justice, we remain far from embracing good and transparent governance practices that ensure fair competition in public and economic life. Moreover, the fight against organized crime and its influence on public and economic life must become a priority for all state structures—and indeed a societal priority.