Students in Serbia and SPAK in Albania: challenging the state-movement system amid the absence of self-corrective democratic mechanisms

By: Veton Surroi

1.

Two years ago, the Albanian lek and Serbian dinar achieved parity. This eased cost calculations for Serbian tourists, who were warmly welcomed in Albania and often praised the hospitality. Some even spoke positively about the smooth and safe transit route through Kosovo.

The leaders of the two countries expressed great public closeness and co-led the “Open Balkans” project. In some circles in Kosovo, this closeness was met with skepticism, ranging from mild distrust to conspiracy theories. These were fueled by the coordination of these two leaders with former Prime Minister Thaçi on a territorial partition plan for Kosovo.

Over the years, speculation about the closeness of the two countries—and their leaders—grew. Both leaders used the same Israeli team to conduct biweekly polls and prepare election campaigns. They also opened doors for massive construction projects—“Belgrade Waterfront” and the Durrës Marina—attracting Emirati investors who brought in names and project sketches, while local investors provided the actual funds, often anonymously.

The perceived closeness extended to Albanian Prime Minister Rama’s frequent, unconsulted interventions in Kosovo’s internal matters, seen as contrary to its interests. This created the impression of a “new brotherhood” between Tirana and Belgrade. For conspiracy theorists, this evoked historical analogies, from Serbian Prime Minister Pashić’s ambitions for access to the Durrës port to the Yugoslav Communist Party’s creation of its Albanian counterpart.

2.

The lek strengthened due to policies allowing foreign cash inflows without origin disclosure or banking system circulation requirements. Meanwhile, the dinar maintained stability, with Serbian citizens enjoying doubled wages thanks to foreign investments in the industrial sector.

Albania and Serbia, like their currencies, are fundamentally different. Albania has no border disputes, has begun EU accession talks, and enjoys predictable growth in tourism and construction. Serbia, however, faces identity and territorial disputes with at least three neighbors, has been negotiating EU membership for years, and boasts an impressive industrial-based economic growth fueled by foreign investment.

Prime Minister Rama is charismatic, feeling at home among Western leaders. President Vučić, on the other hand, navigates global geopolitical chaos, gaining respect from both Western leaders and Presidents Putin and Xi.

Despite their geopolitical and intellectual differences, both leaders share a significant challenge: they lead political movements that have surpassed traditional party competition. Rama’s Socialist Party, with its mix of ideologies, epitomizes a “popular movement.” Vučić’s SNS is a “big tent” party encompassing all ideologies and social classes. Both movements blur lines between governance, business, and state machinery, each headed by a dominant leader.

3.

This year, the legitimacy of both ruling movements is under question. In Serbia, the challenge comes from a grassroots student movement supported by various societal sectors. Triggered by a tragic building collapse in Novi Sad, this movement evolved into a broader societal confrontation with the system. When Vučić offered dialogue, students simply responded, “He is not competent.”

In Albania, no organic movement has emerged to challenge the system. Instead, SPAK (Special Structure Against Corruption and Organized Crime) is tasked with dismantling a deeply entrenched corruption network. Unlike in democracies where corruption is an anomaly, SPAK operates in a system where corruption is the norm.

If SPAK succeeds, it will confront the core issue articulated by Serbian students: how can a party-movement-state, controlled by a single, uncontested leader, not also control systemic corruption?

4.

We don’t know when or how these movements in Serbia and Albania will conclude. Success is not guaranteed for either.

However, we know 2025 has begun as a year of systemic challenge, where, in the absence of democratic self-corrective mechanisms, alternative forces are stepping up to reshape the future.

The Albanian case adds an exotic element to the description of Serbia’s party-movement-state system. In Albania, the leader is also the chief architect and urban planner for the entire country and its cities. Tower heights in Tirana, artistic features, design studios, and many other details are directly determined by the head of the movement/state. Simultaneously, this leader holds uncontested authority to appoint and dismiss officials ranging from ministers, police chiefs, prison guards, local administrators, and countless other positions in between.

In such a system, where elections are overshadowed by the ruling party’s control over employment, judiciary, intelligence services, and much of the media landscape, the possibility of self-correction is minimal. Additionally, the Albanian youth, instead of forming a grassroots challenge, have opted for the largest “movement” in the country: mass emigration.

Thus, in Albania, there appears to be only one avenue for systemic contestation—SPAK and its accompanying judiciary. Paradoxically, SPAK finds itself in a situation resembling Serbia’s student movement: attempting to challenge an entrenched system without the necessary societal mechanisms to support a democratic reset. SPAK faces monumental tasks, as its investigations into corruption invariably strike at the heart of a system where corruption is not an aberration but an intrinsic element of governance.

As SPAK seeks to expose and prosecute corruption within the former leadership now in opposition, it simultaneously signals investigations into those currently in power, including individuals close to the most powerful figure in the country. If SPAK succeeds, it may echo the conclusion reached by Serbian students: in a party-movement-state where decisions are centralized under a single leader, how can corruption not be a fundamental part of its operation?

5.

We cannot predict when or how these movements in Serbia and Albania will culminate. Neither success nor transformative outcomes are guaranteed.

What we do know, however, is that 2025 has marked the beginning of a pivotal era—one of systemic contestation. In the absence of traditional democratic mechanisms for self-correction, alternative forces are emerging to confront and potentially reshape the very foundations of governance in these two nations.

Source: Koha.net