The suspended war between Kosovo and Serbia and the rhetoric about the “erasure of European civilization” are distractions from the core of the NSS—a new policy that marks the end of the unipolar world.
By :Veton Surroi
1.
I met an old American diplomat friend, a long-time supporter of Biden, who told me that President Trump is doing more for the Western Balkans than President Biden—pointing to the ultimatum the U.S. administration has issued to Serbia regarding Russian ownership in the oil industry (NIS), namely an ultimatum to sever dependence on Russian energy. If Serbia were to take this step, Russia would lose one of the pillars of its influence over the country, which, in theory, would allow Belgrade to disengage from other points of influence in the spheres of security and foreign policy.
“It’s a paradox,” he admitted, for a Biden supporter (and a member of the foreign policy team for his presidential campaign) to state that a strategic move by the Trump administration could achieve more than four years of courting the authorities in Belgrade to move toward the West.
A few days later, the NSS 2025—the U.S. National Security Strategy—was published, the document representing the most dramatic shift in American foreign policy this century, indeed since the fall of the Berlin Wall. There, my friend’s paradox took on an expanded form in Kosovo-Serbia relations, as it was announced that President Trump had negotiated peace between the two countries within this year.
Although the leaders of the two countries have not announced such a thing during this year—and various interpretations are possible—let us, for a moment, take as plausible and acceptable the paradox of a negotiated peace of which the leaders of the affected countries themselves are unaware. The assertion that the American president has achieved peace between Kosovo and Serbia would then imply further responsibility on the part of three countries to maintain it—Kosovo, Serbia, and the United States—as well as responsibility for either of the two—Kosovo or Serbia—for any actions that disrupt peace between them.
The NSS thus becomes a determinant of new realities.
2
The White House document represents the most radical turn in American foreign policy since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and in my reading this occurs for two essential reasons. The first is an accurate reading of the historical moment. The NSS declares the era of the United States as the sole global force to be over; it identifies a flawed American strategic belief (“namely, that by opening our markets to China, encouraging American businesses to invest in China, and handing over our manufacturing to China, we would facilitate China’s entry into the so-called ‘rules-based international order.’ This did not happen. China grew richer and stronger, and used its wealth and power to its considerable advantage”); it defines the need for “strategic stability with Russia”; and it envisions a new Middle East as a focal point for U.S. policy coordination—not only in security, but also in nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, and related fields.
The second is—and here is another paradox—an ideological reading of the historical moment. In this sweeping strategic realignment, the NSS views Europe, a natural American ally, through the lens of MAGA ideology.
“Continental Europe has lost a share of global GDP—from 25 percent in 1990 to 14 percent today—partly due to national and transnational regulations that undermine creativity and hard work.
But this economic decline is eclipsed by the real and darker prospect of the erasure of civilization.
The biggest challenges facing Europe include the activities of the European Union and other transnational bodies that undermine freedom and political sovereignty, migration policies that are transforming the continent and creating conflict, censorship of free speech and the suppression of political opposition, declining birth rates, and the loss of national identities and self-confidence.”
3.
This passage has triggered immediate reactions from politicians and intellectuals across Europe, who have not forgotten Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Conference, where he openly advocated for Europe’s far-right groups. When the NSS states that “we want to support our allies in preserving Europe’s freedom and security, while restoring Europe’s civilizational self-confidence and Western identity,” this is read across Europe as a prescription for policies that would attempt to replicate those of the American president—something that has already begun with Prime Minister Orbán and like-minded figures under the MEGA (Make Europe Great Again) banner.
This is a double paradox of the NSS, as it lays down two fundamental principles of the new world order. First, it revives the nineteenth-century Monroe Doctrine, under which the entire Americas—from Alaska to Argentina—become a U.S. sphere of interest, into which no one else may intrude. The paradox is that this doctrine was part of a tacit bargain: America would not allow interference in its hemisphere in exchange for not intervening in European wars. This time, the U.S. demands non-interference in its hemisphere while seeking to determine what Europe should look like. The second paradox is the demand that international relations be the product of actions among sovereign states, while sovereignty also entails the right of European states—individually and collectively—to decide what their values will be. The NSS, in a language akin to the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, treats European values as part of the continent’s decadence.
4.
Some European reactions—especially those that remain focused on issues of values and definitions that may sound offensive (“the real and darker prospect of the erasure of civilization”)—may resemble the viewer of a magician’s trick who watches the wrong hand, the one that draws attention but does not perform the “magic.”
The NSS presents a strategic reconfiguration that begins with a comprehensive confrontation with China and continues along a natural geopolitical trajectory across the globe. In this vectorial reconfiguration, Europe has neither the role of initiator nor of spoiler; over the past four years—and even more so since 2014—Europe has failed to halt Russian aggression in Ukraine. If the United States assumes and fulfills this responsibility, the outcome will be “strategic stability with Russia,” a rebalancing of political, military, and economic relations that will have a direct impact on Europe. Europe—with the NSS-proposed reconfiguration vis-à-vis China, Russia, and the Middle East—assumes the role of a recipient of consequences, not an active actor in shaping the reconfiguration.
Moreover, this historic American turn—perhaps stripped of ideological trappings but with its vectors intact—will remain U.S. foreign policy for future presidents, regardless of party.
For Europe, the issue of J.D. Vance’s support for far-right European parties should be treated as secondary and transient. What will endure is the prospect of a changed world, marked by tectonic shifts, in which Europe’s position is that of a secondary role.