By Vesselin Stoynev
What can be expected from Rumen Radev in the next elections, and how would that change Bulgaria? These are the key questions the outgoing Bulgarian president will have to answer:
President Rumen Radev has opened a new chapter in Bulgarian politics. His move from the presidential office onto the party-political battlefield could give a strong boost to electoral activity and substantially reshape the next parliament, opening space for a new governing configuration that without him had seemed far less likely.
Despite the strong public impact, the positioning of Radev’s party on the parliamentary terrain still lies ahead. In his farewell address as president, he offered no guidance about his own political project. Instead, he sought to draw closer to—or appropriate—all those dissatisfied and opposed to the oligarchic status quo: from the protests of 2020 and 2025, from student circles to Bulgarians in the diaspora. He outlined no ideological or political benchmarks, beyond broad formulas about a “new social contract” and a “battle for the homeland.”
On the party-political field, the president’s “nationwide” appeal, even in a populist version, is constrained by the reality of political self-identification. Radev will have to answer several key questions that will narrow the “big basket” of expectations surrounding him.
Is the euro a good choice?
In his speech, Radev recalled the rejected, unlawful referendum on the euro. But the euro is already a reality, and he will have to say whether its introduction has been successful and positive for the country, even though he previously considered it premature. As a potential leader of a major force in a eurozone member state, he cannot sidestep this issue. Otherwise, suspicions will arise that he is contemplating withdrawal from the eurozone, or at least its sabotage, to prove that he was right and a defender of “true democracy.” But even if he had been right—and he was not—continued “grumbling” would look like exhibitionist political egocentrism, with no view toward the future.
Whose is Greenland?
If in a previous electoral contest Radev had to answer the question “Whose is Crimea?”, today a similarly polarizing question stands before him: “Whose is Greenland?” Metaphorically, this is a key question about his stance toward the EU and the United States, the main benchmark for Bulgaria’s geopolitical orientation in a rapidly changing global context that determines both security and economic prospects. Ultimately, “Whose is Greenland?” boils down to the dilemma “With the EU or with Trump?”, and in the latter case perhaps also “with Trump–Putin.”
Will there be a new “coalition”?
Radev accused PP–DB (albeit indirectly) that the “coalition” erased the line between the corrupt and those fighting corruption. This is understandable, since the agreement with GERB was also directed against him: as president with pro-Russian positions during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and against his governance through caretaker cabinets. If he truly wants to fight the corrupt oligarchic model, he will need partners, and the biggest potential ones are PP–DB, some of whom he until yesterday called “charlatans.” The question “Will you form a coalition?” will be put to both him and them every day until the elections.
What does he offer beyond “anti-Peevski and Borisov”?
Radev will have to offer a broader platform than anti-corruption alone, which will inevitably position him on the left–right axis. Will he maintain current tax and contribution rates, or promote stronger redistribution? Will he seek not only punitive justice but also social justice through liberal-progressive or left-social policies? Will he support a civic and secular approach in education, or advocate religious education in schools? Like any serious party, his will have to offer a comprehensive platform—the question is whether it will contain sufficiently clear distinctions or rest on populist “catch-all” messaging with pleasant, general slogans for the broadest audience.
Who will be on the lists and in the executive ranks?
Like any new party, Radev will face a кадровски (staffing) challenge: many careerists and unprepared figures could undermine the party or strip it of substance through a lack of high-quality personnel. Unconvincing or compromised figureheads could melt away initial hopes. Radev’s advantage is that, with two months to go before the elections, the focus will be more on him than on the team, so initial deficits will not weigh heavily. But as a soldier, he knows that wars are not won in a single battle, but by securing the “peace”—turning victory into lasting success. And that is impossible without a broad, competent, corruption-proof and scandal-resistant кадровска база (personnel base).
Where does the “broad center” position itself?
Radev’s party will most likely try to occupy broad centrist positions, attracting voters from almost all parties and especially from the previously undecided. The most direct donors of votes, despite formal greetings welcoming his entry into the party arena, will likely be Vazrazhdane (Revival), ITN, BSP and Velichie. Vazrazhdane has already entered into sharp confrontation with Radev, pushing itself toward the most radical periphery and leaving him the moderate Russophiles and Eurosceptics—unlike similar Western European parties that have remained on sovereigntist positions amid Trump’s attacks on Europe.
PP–DB also finds itself in a complicated situation: the potential for growth after the protests is shrinking with the emergence of a “fresh competitor” on the anti-corruption field. At the same time, a strong Radev formation could be PP–DB’s most reliable partner against the “captured state,” but could also create problems because of his pro-Russian orientation. Although PP–DB immediately after Radev’s announcement clearly stated that it remains on both tracks—anti-corruption and Europe—possible future cooperation does not necessarily mean direct coalition participation in government, unless, for example, Radev accepts a clear “eastern cordon.”
At present, GERB appears to be in the most favorable position. The party of Boyko Borissov will likely consolidate its forces without major loss of votes in a strategy of defense, with the option of launching sharp attacks against a more convenient opponent than PP–DB—namely Radev himself, who is vulnerable on the issues of Putin, the euro, and “BOTAŞ”*.
*BOTAŞ is a Turkish state-owned gas company with which the Bulgarian caretaker government appointed by Radev signed a gas supply agreement in 2023. Since then, Bulgaria has been paying BOTAŞ around €500,000 per day for a contract that is not implemented in practice.
Source: DW