By: Ben Andoni
Political parties are meant to serve as intermediaries between the state and their voters. Yet, as they function in Albania, they have turned politics into a pursuit of narrow self-interest—seizing power—rather than serving the public good. This explains their harsh reactions, whether in the case of Balluku within the Socialist Party (SP), or the issue of “January 21” within the Democratic Party (DP). Their unchecked power has deformed Albanian democracy.
The failure to reflect the recommendations of OSCE–ODIHR reports, blind loyalty of party members to dysfunctional statutes, individuals selected through closed lists, lack of financial transparency, absence of internal debate, and the movement of members from one party to another—even across ideological lines—have all shaken Albanians’ trust in post-1990 politics. This reality is so evident that the immediate sociological image evoked by the word “politician” is that of a crafty, unscrupulous operator.
The consequences are bitter. The Democracy Index, compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, shows Albania declining in the global rankings for 2025. After North Macedonia and Kosovo, Albania stands at 71st out of 173 countries—two places lower than the previous year.
Within this Albanian political anthropology, a new law on political parties is now more than necessary. The existing law not only fails to discipline our parties, but also lacks adequate mechanisms to address their problems—chief among them transparency in financing, followed by deep internal dysfunctions (especially within the two main parties). As has become routine after every election, OSCE–ODIHR issued recommendations once again following the May 11, 2025 elections. The establishment of a Special Committee on Electoral Reform placed the drafting of a new Law on Political Parties as a priority. International pressure was decisive in bringing this initiative to life, yet the public remains rightly skeptical about its implementation. The key issue remains party financing, among many other unresolved problems.
“Political parties are the least transparent institutions in Albania, both financially and organizationally. The profits of political parties during election campaigns amount to millions. They are the most profitable entities and represent the most lucrative business policies. We carried out Judicial Reform because we did not trust the justice system, and that was a positive development. But if we do not carry out the same reform—vetting and reform—within political parties, which are the institutions with the most power and the least trust in Albania, then we have solved nothing,” stated political scientist Afrim Krasniqi for VOA (2023). Recently, the Institute of Political Studies (ISP) and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) have made this issue one of their priorities, both through activities and through addressing the most urgent areas for intervention and concrete legislative recommendations.
The Albanian political landscape is fertile: according to court registries, there are 132 political parties in existence. The paradox is that while 3,000 signatures are required to establish a political formation, only 15 parties manage to secure votes from their “communities” in elections. The Central Election Commission (CEC) acknowledges that over 70 parties do not even have a registered address (Krasniqi, 2023). Among them, only four have websites, despite the fact that politics and its decisions are now read daily online, researchers note. Only two parties have parliamentary groups; five can be identified as having political programs; and 21 parties receive free state offices. Across four changed electoral systems, only two major parties control political life in Albania (VOA, 2023). Therefore, to enhance the integrity of elected officials, ISP has recommended that the CEC require each candidate, alongside the candidate list, to submit documented data on the party body that selected them—thus demonstrating greater legitimacy and integrity.
In the early 1950s, democracy achieved near-universal recognition as the best possible form of governance in an absolute sense. At that time, commitment to democracy was often more rhetorical than practical, and there was considerable debate about what democracy actually meant in terms of institutions and practices on the ground (McKeon, 1951).
In Albania, this effort came late (after 1990), and the issue became lost in the labyrinths of ambiguity surrounding the traditional character of the two main parties, SP and DP. Working “in their favor” was the prevailing notion that in liberal democratic societies the state normally does not intervene in regulating the behavior and organization of political parties. This led to the fragmentation and eventual split of the DP in recent years, as party structures failed to function according to statute. Within the SP, the lack of transparency is evident in how the administration is used during its governing mandates and in the circulation of funds.
Legislation
Beyond Germany—often considered the “root of party law”—this issue is frequently addressed elsewhere. In many countries, including those in Eastern Europe, there exists an effective Law on Political Parties. These laws establish clear rules regarding internal democratic structures, state financing, and unconstitutional parties. Dutch association law reflects the logic of party statutes, while German law sets out specific standards for decision-making. Under the German model, internal party courts are предусмотрed to resolve disputes between members and the party. This is significant, as such mechanisms enable parties to function. Had this existed within the DP, it might not have disintegrated. Under German law, a political party must not only have a written statute, but the law also specifies what that statute must contain. The description of members’ rights and duties is directly linked to the integrity of party officials and party members holding public office. Unfortunately, due to our political culture, democracy has been eroded from this very foundation.
Financing and a Brief History
Although the costs of democracy (Heard, 1960) vary among Western democracies, most have introduced a new source of income for parties and/or candidates: public funding. From the mid-1960s, many countries began providing state funds to political parties (IDEA, 2003; Nassmacher, 2009; Van Biezen, 2010). Rising expenses—mainly due to higher campaign costs—were difficult to cover through stagnant or declining revenues from membership fees. This is particularly problematic in Albania, where membership fees contribute very little. In other contexts, the state stepped in. West Germany was the first European country to introduce state subsidies for political parties (1967), driven by a principled concern rooted in historical memory: the Nazi Party’s receipt of large sums from German corporations between the two World Wars. This convinced many that dependence on corporate donations should be prevented and replaced with funding from a democratically controlled state. This approach was widely adopted, resulting in high costs of democracy—higher even than in the United States, Canada, Austria, and the Netherlands—as documented in Regulation of Political Parties by Leiden University. While financial comparisons are difficult, the relatively high costs of democracy in Germany and elsewhere in continental Europe are explained by the fact that parties spend heavily not only on campaigns but also on their permanent party organizations. Scholars emphasize the need to distinguish between campaign costs and routine costs, as well as between expenditures by individual candidates and by party organizations.
Most political parties in Albania lack accurate addresses and, as a result, are never included in audits planned by experts appointed by the CEC. In its annual report, the CEC noted that in 2023, nine licensed experts were appointed to conduct such audits. “From the reports submitted by legal auditors, audits were not carried out for 84 political parties due to inaccurate addresses, or because parties—despite being notified of the audit process—failed to contact the auditors,” the report states. Regarding financial support, the CEC report revealed that in 2023 parties received 345.6 million lekë (approximately €3.3 million). This amount was distributed among 11 parties, led by the Socialist Party, followed by the Democratic Party, the Party for Justice, Integration and Unity, the Union for Human Rights Party, and finally “Nisma Thurje” (Monitor, 2024).
The CEC acknowledges that one area requiring attention is improving the rules on campaign financing. Yet reality suggests this remains impossible—at least for now—so perhaps a new law could change something. At the very least, for democracy. So far, the mission seems impossible, as many parties do not cooperate, remain informal, and merely survive to secure privileges. The outcome of weak regulation within the main parties is the face of our democracy, where the sole objective is the exploitation of power. Eisenhower foresaw this condition well: “If a political party does not have its foundation in a determination to advance a cause that is right and that is moral, then it is not a political party; it is merely a conspiracy to seize power.”
This article is produced within the framework of the project “Improving the Legal Framework for Political Parties through the Law on Political Parties and/or the Electoral Code,” implemented by the Institute of Political Studies (ISP) in cooperation with the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), with financial support from the British Embassy in Tirana.