By Xhelal Neziri
Since the beginning of Russian aggression in Ukraine (2022), the European Union (EU) has been working to accelerate the accession process for six Western Balkan countries and four Eastern European states. What was once a largely administrative process — in which accession candidates sign association and stabilization agreements, obtain candidate status, and complete negotiating chapters grouped into six clusters — has now become a geopolitical priority for Brussels. Aligning EU foreign policy on Russia will not be sufficient so long as part of the Union’s immediate neighborhood, including the often-challenging Southeast, remains exposed to Russian and Chinese influence. The EU is therefore shifting more of its strategic focus to the Western Balkans, parallel to its rapid rearmament under the “Rearm Europe” initiative, which foresees €800 billion in defense spending by 2030. EU member states have also increased national defense budgets; Germany alone plans an annual defense budget of €153 billion by 2029.
This transition from “soft power” to “hard power” marks a new European paradigm in dealing with Russia and China. It calls for greater political and security distance from both powers to ensure effective protection against malign influence. After 75 years of prioritizing economic development — heavily reliant on cheap Russian energy — the EU is now assuming wider responsibility for defense. This paradigm shift also implies a more assertive approach toward Western Balkan aspirants, many of whom publicly claim commitment to EU membership while quietly obstructing the process. Brussels has increasingly internalized this narrative, even as the EU’s own enlargement rhetoric remained ambivalent. Now that the EU’s strategic interest in enlargement exceeds the Western Balkans’ political will to reform, Brussels’ approach to the region is set to evolve.
Beyond Albania and Kosovo, Russia maintains a significant political, cultural, and energy footprint in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Montenegro. China, meanwhile, has entrenched itself economically across the region. The European Commission’s latest Progress Reports, published on November 4, show that foreign-policy alignment — particularly regarding Russia — remains one of the biggest obstacles to European integration, as each state calibrates its stance based on national interests.
SERBIA – THE MAIN CHALLENGE
The report on Serbia underscores that Belgrade has made little progress in aligning with the EU’s Common Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy. High-level contacts with Russia have intensified, alongside anti-Western narratives and participation in Russian military ceremonies. Even amid geopolitical confrontation, Serbia continues its long-standing “two-chair” strategy: it has not joined EU sanctions against Russia yet cooperates with the EU on humanitarian and financial support to Ukraine.
The Commission warns that information manipulation and hybrid threats remain widespread, driven in part by the Russian broadcaster RT Balkan, now licensed on state cable networks. Serbia’s energy dependence on Russia remains high, while the large number of Russian nationals receiving Serbian citizenship — with visa-free access to the EU — poses additional security concerns. Brussels calls for stronger legal and operational measures to counter hybrid threats and cyber vulnerabilities. Regarding China, the EU flags concerns over Serbia’s free trade agreement with Beijing, in force since June 1, 2024.
COMPLEX POLITICS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s layered political structure shapes its approach to the EU, Russia, and China. The progress report confirms the country’s alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy but notes resistance to implementing restrictive measures against Russia, particularly from ministries controlled by Milorad Dodik’s SNSD. Republika Srpska’s authorities maintain close ties with Moscow, while public broadcasters remain politically influenced, enabling the spread of Russian disinformation via outlets such as RTRS.
Bosnia’s visa policy remains partially misaligned with the EU, and hybrid threats — including cyberattacks and disinformation — continue to undermine institutional resilience. According to Brussels, the country needs a coherent foreign-policy strategy, stronger mechanisms for enforcing sanctions, and a clearer framework for countering foreign information manipulation.
MONTENEGRO – A LEADER IN INTEGRATION, BUT WITH MANY NEW CITIZENS FROM RUSSIA
Montenegro receives EU praise for granting temporary protection to the highest number of Ukrainian citizens in the region and providing access to healthcare and accommodation above EU minimum standards. The EU remains Montenegro’s leading trading partner and largest investor, followed by Serbia, Russia, and Turkey. Montenegro has fully aligned with EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus, supported UN resolutions on Ukraine, and actively countered hybrid threats, including cyber and information attacks.
However, Brussels raises concerns similar to those directed at Serbia regarding citizenship granted to Russian and Belarusian nationals. In 2024, Montenegro approved 1,282 citizenships under the investor program — which formally ended in December 2022 — including 709 Russians, 42 Belarusians, and 29 Saudis. The Commission stresses that Montenegro must conduct rigorous security checks for all remaining applications and reject those involving individuals under international sanctions.
NORTH MACEDONIA – FULL ALIGNMENT WITH EU FOREIGN POLICY
Skopje continues to uphold EU sanctions against Russia and provides humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. According to the report, North Macedonia has strengthened preparations for aligning with the EU’s Common Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy and participates in EU crisis management missions. However, the Commission notes that the impact of sanctions is not fully reflected in relevant economic indicators.
North Macedonia has adopted strategies to counter hybrid threats, including an operational team dedicated to cybersecurity. Yet the report highlights gaps in the legal framework for addressing foreign information manipulation and calls for additional measures to strengthen institutional and societal resilience.
KOSOVO AND ALBANIA
Brussels notes that Kosovo continues to voluntarily align with the EU’s foreign and security policy, including sanctions against Russia and Belarus, and provides military assistance and training to Ukraine. However, the media environment remains polarized, and disinformation is widespread — both domestic and foreign — with RT Balkan and Sputnik Srbija serving as key vectors. Their narratives, amplified via Serbian media, undermine the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions. The Commission adds that key bodies, including the Central Election Commission, have failed to act proactively against disinformation, weakening public trust.
Albania — together with Montenegro one of the region’s frontrunners in integration — fully adheres to EU foreign policy, including sanctions on Russia. This underscores Albania’s commitment to EU membership and its reliability as a partner. According to the report, Albania has strengthened its national security framework, adopted the National Cybersecurity Strategy (2025–2030), and introduced its first national strategy against foreign interference and disinformation. Albania has joined the European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats and remains active in EU and UN initiatives on cyber and information security.
While Albania and Kosovo maintain high alignment with EU policy toward Russia and China, other countries take a more selective approach. Serbia, aligned with only 63% of EU foreign policy, remains the outlier — continuing to resist sanctions on Russia while enabling political, economic, and cultural Russian influence across the region. This influence extends into Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.
For Brussels, Serbia will remain at the center of attention, as it is the key hub of most geopolitical entanglements slowing down the Western Balkans’ path toward EU membership.
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