By Ben Andoni
The prime minister’s reply during an interview at the Italian–Albanian intergovernmental meeting—when he said he has no political “son” to replace him—made an impression for only a few minutes. If it were truly surprising, it would have been commented on, analyzed, and we would already be speculating about the profile of Albania’s future leaders.
Today, no one can even imagine the “identikit” of Rama’s successor or the person who will lead the Socialist Party after him. The cult built around him is so enormous that the mere mention of alternative names is perceived as grotesque. In the opposite camp, bringing up a successor to Berisha—after the “Basha” episode—is pure heresy. “Let anyone come and confront me in elections,” says Berisha, the most prominent political figure of the last 35 years, with unimaginable highs and lows. Their disdain toward any political Alter Ego is open and cynical. No one can be compared to them.
Propaganda surrounding Rama helps him; meanwhile, the faint calls for Berisha to “reflect” evaporate in the air. The first, because internal democracy in the DP is brilliant in form but utterly fraudulent in practice. The promotion of Basha, the primaries, the inferior candidate lists—are among its clearest symptoms. As for the SP, propaganda isn’t even necessary: Rama dictates with the power of the Executive he leads. He answers to no Legislative power; the presidency brings him no headaches with decrees; the party has turned into a detachment (the choreography of silence in the Assembly shows this at any moment). His international performance—with the opening of the last cluster—is dazzling for an Albanian prime minister. His propaganda has become simple and direct: “With Edi in Europe in the ’30s.” Berisha’s propaganda is even clearer: “No one can topple Rama, except Berisha.” Anyone in the DP who dares deviate from the line eventually returns to the same point: Yes, only Berisha! The century-old “cynic” Noam Chomsky explains this democratic deadlock rather well: “That’s the whole point of good propaganda. You have to create a slogan that nobody’s going to be against and everybody’s going to be for. Nobody knows what it means, because it doesn’t mean anything.”
There is a deeper logic, one that is more anthropological. In Eastern Europe, it is natural—completely normal—for political elites to avoid, even rhetorically, the notion of a successor. Serbia, Hungary, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (especially Republika Srpska), Poland, Bulgaria, Georgia—are illustrative examples. For Albanians, the explanation is clear: post-communist political culture is tied to the internal fear that once prevailed, where rivals were eliminated because they threatened the leader’s position. Albania is a textbook case: the massacre Enver Hoxha carried out against his closest collaborators, the very people with whom he won and kept power after World War II. Today, in the SP, many of those who began governing with Rama no longer appear even in photographs—they’ve been sidelined or worse, ended up in prison or politically penalized. In the DP, the situation is worse: anyone who dared even raise their voice against Berisha has ceased to exist politically. As everywhere in the East, parties are not built on institutions but on individuals. Their statutes are beautifully sewn according to democratic standards, yet do not function. When, in the end, accountability is to the party chairman, you understand how effective these statutes really are. Had the DP’s statute functioned, the split with Basha and Berisha’s “Foltorja” turmoil would never have occurred. And if you weren’t loyal to Berisha, you ended up on the “Open List”—as happened—where the probability of winning in this year’s elections was minimal. As for ideology, it has long been forgotten. The Socialist Party behaves comfortably like a right-wing party and maintains its closest ties with problematic right-wing governments (including Meloni, Orbán), while the Democratic Party speaks with a left-leaning discourse—first, to absorb the large left-leaning electorate in the country, and second, to project a very social image to the broad public.
Meanwhile, in our country, the biggest democratic challenge remains elections. Voting is still influenced by regional loyalties and especially by the use of the large public administration apparatus—defects long noted and publicized by OSCE-ODIHR. Parties show weakness on the ground because they completely forget their base, and above all, the noise of small parties “scrambles” the political chessboard. In such conditions, Rama and Berisha project their presence and personify elections with their own names. The system crafted jointly by the SP and DP in the electoral reform strengthens their dominance; even with Open Lists, their direct or indirect presence shapes outcomes. As for the Alter Egos of party leaders—forget it—they don’t exist, not even in dreams. Rama has long said he will leave when he wishes, while Berisha insists he will not leave and has enough strength to return to power even in his eighties. “He has the strength of a young man,” declared Mr. Noka, one of his secretaries, alluding to sexual potency! In every bit of this theater, Rama’s posture radiates challenge, dominance, and certainty; while Berisha, carefully groomed, projects stability as he forcefully explains the government’s disasters.
In systems like ours, the leader’s power has an oligarchic influence, where business–political networks and clientelism thrive, and where leaders function as focal points that distribute resources. The media constantly references how many building permits are tied to Berisha’s people, or how others enjoy power through their ties and proximity to Rama. Rama’s fugitive former deputy Ahmetaj listed several such examples. Now imagine a successor gaining access to these resources—the supreme leader would lose power and opportunity. Thus, our leaders seem to delay their political succession. It’s as if they want to take the office with them…
One is reminded of the moment when the German chancellor visited Albania. In the protocol greeting in front of the National Museum, he gestured toward Rama (right after the elections): “You—four times!” It is true that Chancellor Merkel stayed long in power, but German institutions function. The British ones even more. Even those of our Italian neighbors.